Details
BUCHANAN, James. Autograph letter signed ("James Buchanan") to Jeremiah S. Black (1810-1883), Wheatland, [Pennsylvania], 18 January 1850. 1½ pages, 4to (10 1/8 x 8 in.), minor soiling on verso, professional repairs to folds.
SLAVERY, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMPROMISE OF 1850: BUCHANAN SCORNFULLY PREDICTS THAT, FACED WITH THE ALTERNATIVES OF TOLERATING SLAVERY OR INVITING "THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNION, THE YANKEES WILL BE THE FIRST TO BACK OUT"
A revealing letter on the tumultuous Congressional debates over the future of slavery in the lands acquired at the end of the Mexican War, containing the scornful prediction that Northerners, faced with the alternatives of tolerating slavery or the dissolution of the union, "will be the first to back out." The Wilmot Proviso, which would have prohibited slavery in the territory of the Mexican secession of slavery into the new territories, was the catalyst for a contentious Congressional debate which raged from Deceember 1849: "Threats of disunion became a byword...Jefferson Davis reportedly challenged an Illinois congressman to a duel, and Senator Henry S. Foote (also of Mississippi) drew a loaded revolver during a heated debate" (McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 68).
Buchanan, back in Pennsylvania after serving as Polk's Secretary of State, writes in the midst of the debate. Always mindful of his standing with the electorate, Buchanan complains that one of his personal letters regarding slavery had been made public: "Grund got hold of it," he reports, adding "the time & the manner of doing a thing are often of as much importance as the thing itself, & I did not choose to have Grund considered as my avant courier."
Referring to the current debate, he is severly critical of the position of Democrat Lewis Cass (1782-1866), the apostle of popular sovereignty, a doctrine--claiming Constitutional sanction--by which the residents of any territory would decide for themselves whether to allow or prohibit slavery: "Cass...has greatly embarassed this question. The true construction of the Constitution, the uniform practise of the Government, including the passage of the Missouri Compromise, the right of war over a conquered country are all at variance with the doctrine that the people of such a territory possess the exclusive power over the question of slavery. Besides, in point of expediency, does the principle of non-intervention settle the question? Does it not always leave the question open for agitation?"
Buchanan reaffirms his own plan to settle the debate; the simple extension of the Missouri Compromise line (based on the old Mason-Dixon survey line, see notes to lot 4), which partitioned the nation into slaveholding and non-slaveholding sections: "The Missouri Compromise would have settled it forever & then the agitation would have ceased. I perceive that some of the Southern papers are now coming out strongly in favor of the Compromise; & what embarassed me in making any publication on the subject is that I do not like to abandon my first ground." In a final remark, Buchanan predicts that the crisis will be averted by a capitulation on the part of the North: "nothing is more certain than that the Democratic Party will be compelled to abandon the Wilmot Proviso. Whenever the alternative is presented between this miserable humbug & the dissolution of the Union the Yankees will be the first to back out."
Buchanan's warning that failing to deal with the issue would lead to further agitation proved prophetic. Although the Compromise of 1850 brought a temporary end to the debate, a renewed conflict over slavery's extension erupted in 1854 with the proposed admission of Kansas as a state. Buchanan's election as President in 1856 was marred by the sectional issues that he hoped to avoid. When secession became a reality in late 1860, it was Buchanan who would capitulate, in his refusal to use federal force to prevent the dissolution of the Union. That task would be left to his successor.
Provenance: Paul C. Richards, 1979.
SLAVERY, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMPROMISE OF 1850: BUCHANAN SCORNFULLY PREDICTS THAT, FACED WITH THE ALTERNATIVES OF TOLERATING SLAVERY OR INVITING "THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNION, THE YANKEES WILL BE THE FIRST TO BACK OUT"
A revealing letter on the tumultuous Congressional debates over the future of slavery in the lands acquired at the end of the Mexican War, containing the scornful prediction that Northerners, faced with the alternatives of tolerating slavery or the dissolution of the union, "will be the first to back out." The Wilmot Proviso, which would have prohibited slavery in the territory of the Mexican secession of slavery into the new territories, was the catalyst for a contentious Congressional debate which raged from Deceember 1849: "Threats of disunion became a byword...Jefferson Davis reportedly challenged an Illinois congressman to a duel, and Senator Henry S. Foote (also of Mississippi) drew a loaded revolver during a heated debate" (McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 68).
Buchanan, back in Pennsylvania after serving as Polk's Secretary of State, writes in the midst of the debate. Always mindful of his standing with the electorate, Buchanan complains that one of his personal letters regarding slavery had been made public: "Grund got hold of it," he reports, adding "the time & the manner of doing a thing are often of as much importance as the thing itself, & I did not choose to have Grund considered as my avant courier."
Referring to the current debate, he is severly critical of the position of Democrat Lewis Cass (1782-1866), the apostle of popular sovereignty, a doctrine--claiming Constitutional sanction--by which the residents of any territory would decide for themselves whether to allow or prohibit slavery: "Cass...has greatly embarassed this question. The true construction of the Constitution, the uniform practise of the Government, including the passage of the Missouri Compromise, the right of war over a conquered country are all at variance with the doctrine that the people of such a territory possess the exclusive power over the question of slavery. Besides, in point of expediency, does the principle of non-intervention settle the question? Does it not always leave the question open for agitation?"
Buchanan reaffirms his own plan to settle the debate; the simple extension of the Missouri Compromise line (based on the old Mason-Dixon survey line, see notes to lot 4), which partitioned the nation into slaveholding and non-slaveholding sections: "The Missouri Compromise would have settled it forever & then the agitation would have ceased. I perceive that some of the Southern papers are now coming out strongly in favor of the Compromise; & what embarassed me in making any publication on the subject is that I do not like to abandon my first ground." In a final remark, Buchanan predicts that the crisis will be averted by a capitulation on the part of the North: "nothing is more certain than that the Democratic Party will be compelled to abandon the Wilmot Proviso. Whenever the alternative is presented between this miserable humbug & the dissolution of the Union the Yankees will be the first to back out."
Buchanan's warning that failing to deal with the issue would lead to further agitation proved prophetic. Although the Compromise of 1850 brought a temporary end to the debate, a renewed conflict over slavery's extension erupted in 1854 with the proposed admission of Kansas as a state. Buchanan's election as President in 1856 was marred by the sectional issues that he hoped to avoid. When secession became a reality in late 1860, it was Buchanan who would capitulate, in his refusal to use federal force to prevent the dissolution of the Union. That task would be left to his successor.
Provenance: Paul C. Richards, 1979.