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LINCOLN, Abraham. Aurograph letter signed ("A. Lincoln") as President, with postscript signed ("A L."), TO SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM H. SEWARD and SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY SALMON P. CHASE, (this constituting the copy sent to the latter), Executive Mansion, Washington, 20 December 1862. 1 page, 4to, on lined Executive Mansion stationary.
"THE PUBLIC INTEREST DOES NOT ADMIT OF IT." A CABINET CRISIS AVERTED: LINCOLN DECLINES THE RESIGNATIONS OF SEWARD AND CHASE
A most significant presidential letter of Lincoln, constituting one of the central documents in a profound crisis of confidence that severely threatened his administration's authority. It ended an episode one historian has termed "the most serious governmental crisis of his presidency" (D.H. Donald, Lincoln, p.495). "Gentlemen," Lincoln writes, "you have respectfully tendered your resignations as Secretary of State, and Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. I am apprised of the circumstances which may render this course personally desirable to each of you; but, after most anxious consideration, my deliberate judgement is, that the public interest does not admit of it. I therefore have to request that you will resume the duties of your Departments respectfully." In a brief postscript, the President adds: "Same as above sent to Gov. Seward."
The crisis erupted in the wake of a military disaster, the debacle at Fredericksburg, six days before, which caused some 12,000 casualties on the Union side. To many, this latest defeat, coming on the heels of McClellan's bumbling Peninsula campaign, "seemed only a part of a larger pattern of failure and incompetence" (Donald, p.399). While the critics did not openly question Lincoln's own competence as Chief Executive, the groundswell of discontent focused on Lincoln's cabinet--reported to be in dysfunctional disarray--and, most particularly, on Secretary of State William H. Seward. The Secretary of State had made many enemies, and many imagined that he exerted a deeply pernicious influence over the President. The anti-Seward feeling was skillfully fanned by Salmon P. Chase, Seward's bitter rival, in private conservations with leading radical Republicans and in personal letters. On December 16, Republican Senators held a private caucus to discuss the crisis and voted to demand the removal of Seward, "who had come to represent everything that was wrong with the Lincoln administration" (Donald, p.401). When informed of the movement for his removal, Seward vowed that "They may do as they please about me, but they shall not put the President in a false position on my account." He immediately dictated a letter of resignation to his son, Frederick, serving as Assistant Secretary of State. Frederick then wrote out and signed an identical letter for himself (both in the Lincoln Papers, LOC).
The Republicans met again and appointed a Committee of Nine to press their demands directly with the President. Already alarmed by the public uproar over Fredericksburg, Lincoln observed that the radical Republicans "wish to get rid of me," and added that "I am sometimes half disposed to gratify them." For three hours that afternoon Lincoln listened patiently and to the litany of complaints voiced by the nine Senators. The next day, he convened the cabinet--minus Seward--to report on the situation and Seward's resignation. Then, in a stroke of tactical and administrative inspiration, Lincoln arranged for the cabinet and the Committee of Nine to confront each other in his presence for a full airing of the issues. In brief remarks, Lincoln denied that the cabinet was divided and called on the members of the cabinet to confirm his statements. This placed Chase--who had been spreading negative information--in a most awkward position, for, "if he now repeated his frequent complaints to the senators, his disloyalty to the President would be apparent. If he supported Lincoln's statement, it would be evident that he had deceived the senators." (Donald, p. 404). Chase hemmed and hawed, in acute embarrassment, but in the end felt compelled to side with Lincoln, and "endorsed the president's comments that there had been accord on most measures" (Goodwin, Team of Rivals, p.492). Grudgingly, Chase even admitted that Seward's amendments to the Emancipation Proclamation had materially improved that proclamation. Lincoln had managed, in the course of the five-hour meeting, to defuse most of the criticism of the cabinet, and to counter and deflect calls for Seward's removal. In the end, five of the nine senators agreed not to call for Seward's resignation.
But Lincoln was still in a dilemma: to refuse Seward's resignation would appear affront the radical Republicans. Seward, too, was the cabinet member whom Lincoln most relied upon. His departure would be disastrous. Luckily, the next morning, the chastened Chase, his dissimulations exposed, wrote out his own resignation and handed it, reluctantly, to the President. As eyewitness Gideon Welles recorded, Lincoln took Chase's letter of resignation and exclaimed, "I can dispose of this subject now without difficulty." After the cabinet left, Lincoln wrote out two identical letters--one to Seward and another (the present) to Chase--declining to accept their resignations as "the public interest will not admit of it." In a display of adroit diplomacy, Lincoln had defended a valued cabinet member who might have been made a scapegoat, stood up resolutely to his most vocal critics and fought off attempts to meddle with an administration dedicated to the task of bringing the war to a successful resolution. Published (from Lincoln's retained draft) in Basler, 6: 12-13.
[With:] SEWARD, William H. Letter signed (a transcript, marked "copy"), to President Lincoln, in response to the President's refusal to accept his resignation, Department of State, Washington, "Sunday Morning," 21 December 1862. 1 page, 8vo. "I have cheerfully resumed the functions of this department in obedience to your command." (The recipient's copy, signed by Seward, is in the Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress). Provenance: Ralph G. Newman, 1985.
"THE PUBLIC INTEREST DOES NOT ADMIT OF IT." A CABINET CRISIS AVERTED: LINCOLN DECLINES THE RESIGNATIONS OF SEWARD AND CHASE
A most significant presidential letter of Lincoln, constituting one of the central documents in a profound crisis of confidence that severely threatened his administration's authority. It ended an episode one historian has termed "the most serious governmental crisis of his presidency" (D.H. Donald, Lincoln, p.495). "Gentlemen," Lincoln writes, "you have respectfully tendered your resignations as Secretary of State, and Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. I am apprised of the circumstances which may render this course personally desirable to each of you; but, after most anxious consideration, my deliberate judgement is, that the public interest does not admit of it. I therefore have to request that you will resume the duties of your Departments respectfully." In a brief postscript, the President adds: "Same as above sent to Gov. Seward."
The crisis erupted in the wake of a military disaster, the debacle at Fredericksburg, six days before, which caused some 12,000 casualties on the Union side. To many, this latest defeat, coming on the heels of McClellan's bumbling Peninsula campaign, "seemed only a part of a larger pattern of failure and incompetence" (Donald, p.399). While the critics did not openly question Lincoln's own competence as Chief Executive, the groundswell of discontent focused on Lincoln's cabinet--reported to be in dysfunctional disarray--and, most particularly, on Secretary of State William H. Seward. The Secretary of State had made many enemies, and many imagined that he exerted a deeply pernicious influence over the President. The anti-Seward feeling was skillfully fanned by Salmon P. Chase, Seward's bitter rival, in private conservations with leading radical Republicans and in personal letters. On December 16, Republican Senators held a private caucus to discuss the crisis and voted to demand the removal of Seward, "who had come to represent everything that was wrong with the Lincoln administration" (Donald, p.401). When informed of the movement for his removal, Seward vowed that "They may do as they please about me, but they shall not put the President in a false position on my account." He immediately dictated a letter of resignation to his son, Frederick, serving as Assistant Secretary of State. Frederick then wrote out and signed an identical letter for himself (both in the Lincoln Papers, LOC).
The Republicans met again and appointed a Committee of Nine to press their demands directly with the President. Already alarmed by the public uproar over Fredericksburg, Lincoln observed that the radical Republicans "wish to get rid of me," and added that "I am sometimes half disposed to gratify them." For three hours that afternoon Lincoln listened patiently and to the litany of complaints voiced by the nine Senators. The next day, he convened the cabinet--minus Seward--to report on the situation and Seward's resignation. Then, in a stroke of tactical and administrative inspiration, Lincoln arranged for the cabinet and the Committee of Nine to confront each other in his presence for a full airing of the issues. In brief remarks, Lincoln denied that the cabinet was divided and called on the members of the cabinet to confirm his statements. This placed Chase--who had been spreading negative information--in a most awkward position, for, "if he now repeated his frequent complaints to the senators, his disloyalty to the President would be apparent. If he supported Lincoln's statement, it would be evident that he had deceived the senators." (Donald, p. 404). Chase hemmed and hawed, in acute embarrassment, but in the end felt compelled to side with Lincoln, and "endorsed the president's comments that there had been accord on most measures" (Goodwin, Team of Rivals, p.492). Grudgingly, Chase even admitted that Seward's amendments to the Emancipation Proclamation had materially improved that proclamation. Lincoln had managed, in the course of the five-hour meeting, to defuse most of the criticism of the cabinet, and to counter and deflect calls for Seward's removal. In the end, five of the nine senators agreed not to call for Seward's resignation.
But Lincoln was still in a dilemma: to refuse Seward's resignation would appear affront the radical Republicans. Seward, too, was the cabinet member whom Lincoln most relied upon. His departure would be disastrous. Luckily, the next morning, the chastened Chase, his dissimulations exposed, wrote out his own resignation and handed it, reluctantly, to the President. As eyewitness Gideon Welles recorded, Lincoln took Chase's letter of resignation and exclaimed, "I can dispose of this subject now without difficulty." After the cabinet left, Lincoln wrote out two identical letters--one to Seward and another (the present) to Chase--declining to accept their resignations as "the public interest will not admit of it." In a display of adroit diplomacy, Lincoln had defended a valued cabinet member who might have been made a scapegoat, stood up resolutely to his most vocal critics and fought off attempts to meddle with an administration dedicated to the task of bringing the war to a successful resolution. Published (from Lincoln's retained draft) in Basler, 6: 12-13.
[With:] SEWARD, William H. Letter signed (a transcript, marked "copy"), to President Lincoln, in response to the President's refusal to accept his resignation, Department of State, Washington, "Sunday Morning," 21 December 1862. 1 page, 8vo. "I have cheerfully resumed the functions of this department in obedience to your command." (The recipient's copy, signed by Seward, is in the Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress). Provenance: Ralph G. Newman, 1985.