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Richard Feynman on Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem
Lecture notes and annotated book, c.1960
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Richard Feynman on Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem
Lecture notes and annotated book, c.1960
FEYNMAN, Richard (1918-1988). Autograph manuscript, "Plan of Proof. Dem (x, z) is a proposition. It means the functional relation that x, z have to have if prop with Godel no. x is a demonstration of prop of Godel no z...", c.1960.
Two and a quarter pages, quarto. In red pen on rectos and black pen on second verso (a little toned and worn at edges from being inserted into this book:) NAGEL, Ernest and NEWMAN, James. Gödels' Proof. New York University Press, 1960. Feynman’s copy; with two ownership signatures (one in pencil) and annotated by him in pencil. Housed in two custom cloth cases.
A revealing record of Richard Feynman’s engagement with one of the central achievements of twentieth‑century logic: Gödel’s insight that a system can contain a statement that declares its own unprovability.
Gödel’s completeness and incompleteness theorems of 1930-31 reshaped modern logic. The completeness theorem established that every valid first‑order statement is provable from its axioms. The incompleteness theorem showed the opposite limit: any system strong enough to express basic arithmetic will contain true but unprovable statements, and cannot prove its own consistency. Together, these results continue to influence fields from philosophy to theoretical computer science.
These notes outline Gödel’s work in Feynman’s characteristically direct manner. By the time Feynman made them (no earlier than 1960), he of course knew Gödel’s theorems intimately. This outline is most likely lecture notes for his Caltech students. This was right around the time that Feynman was preparing lectures for his famous introductory physics course for Caltech freshmen and sophomores which were later collected as The Feynman Lectures on Physics.
One marginal comment in the copy of the book is particularly characteristic of his unpretentious yet rigorous attitude. Where the authors explain that “Gödel showed (i) how to construct an arithmetical formula G that represents the metamathematical statement: ‘The formula G is not demonstrable.’” Feynman’s marginal remark is: “This is the hard part. All the rest of the steps are easy and evident.”
Gödel, whom Feynman had joined in 1954 as a recipient of the Albert Einstein Award, was one of the few thinkers whom even Feynman approached with a measure of awe. These pages testify to his active effort to understand, clarify, and communicate a theorem which was foundational to 20th century mathematics and science.
Lecture notes and annotated book, c.1960
FEYNMAN, Richard (1918-1988). Autograph manuscript, "Plan of Proof. Dem (x, z) is a proposition. It means the functional relation that x, z have to have if prop with Godel no. x is a demonstration of prop of Godel no z...", c.1960.
Two and a quarter pages, quarto. In red pen on rectos and black pen on second verso (a little toned and worn at edges from being inserted into this book:) NAGEL, Ernest and NEWMAN, James. Gödels' Proof. New York University Press, 1960. Feynman’s copy; with two ownership signatures (one in pencil) and annotated by him in pencil. Housed in two custom cloth cases.
A revealing record of Richard Feynman’s engagement with one of the central achievements of twentieth‑century logic: Gödel’s insight that a system can contain a statement that declares its own unprovability.
Gödel’s completeness and incompleteness theorems of 1930-31 reshaped modern logic. The completeness theorem established that every valid first‑order statement is provable from its axioms. The incompleteness theorem showed the opposite limit: any system strong enough to express basic arithmetic will contain true but unprovable statements, and cannot prove its own consistency. Together, these results continue to influence fields from philosophy to theoretical computer science.
These notes outline Gödel’s work in Feynman’s characteristically direct manner. By the time Feynman made them (no earlier than 1960), he of course knew Gödel’s theorems intimately. This outline is most likely lecture notes for his Caltech students. This was right around the time that Feynman was preparing lectures for his famous introductory physics course for Caltech freshmen and sophomores which were later collected as The Feynman Lectures on Physics.
One marginal comment in the copy of the book is particularly characteristic of his unpretentious yet rigorous attitude. Where the authors explain that “Gödel showed (i) how to construct an arithmetical formula G that represents the metamathematical statement: ‘The formula G is not demonstrable.’” Feynman’s marginal remark is: “This is the hard part. All the rest of the steps are easy and evident.”
Gödel, whom Feynman had joined in 1954 as a recipient of the Albert Einstein Award, was one of the few thinkers whom even Feynman approached with a measure of awe. These pages testify to his active effort to understand, clarify, and communicate a theorem which was foundational to 20th century mathematics and science.
Provenance
From the Papers of Richard P. Feynman (sold; Sotheby's New York, 30 November 2018, lot 83)
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