MONROE, JAMES, President. Autograph letter signed ("Jas Monroe") as Minister to Great Britain, to Joel Barlow, London, 21 August 1803. 4 pages, 4to, 248 x 198mm. (9 7/8 x 7 3/4 in.), a few scattered light stains, otherwise in very good condition, red cloth protective chemise, quarter red morocco gilt slipcase. [With:] A contemporary secretarial transcript of the same letter in an unidentified hand, 4 pages, 4to, paper watermarked "R Williams 1801 Kent."

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MONROE, JAMES, President. Autograph letter signed ("Jas Monroe") as Minister to Great Britain, to Joel Barlow, London, 21 August 1803. 4 pages, 4to, 248 x 198mm. (9 7/8 x 7 3/4 in.), a few scattered light stains, otherwise in very good condition, red cloth protective chemise, quarter red morocco gilt slipcase. [With:] A contemporary secretarial transcript of the same letter in an unidentified hand, 4 pages, 4to, paper watermarked "R Williams 1801 Kent."

DIPLOMATIC POKER: MONROE AUTHORIZES A DOWN PAYMENT IN ADVANCE OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE TREATY: "IT OUGHT NOT TO BE SUSPECTED THAT WE ARE TRIFLING WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE, OR GAINING TIME BY AN IDLE CORRESPONDENCE"

An important diplomatic letter to Barlow, an unofficial but trusted go-between, concerning the crucial $2,000,000 payment to France as a down payment to ensure that Napoleon would not circumvent implementation of the treaty once it had been duly ratified by Congress (as it was on 21 October 1803). Monroe here enlists Barlow, an American citizen of France and friend of Thomas Paine, to transmit the guarantee, which he has already signed, to the French Minister of Finance Barbé-Marbois and to Robert Livingston, Minister Plenipotentiary and co-signer of the Louisiana Purchase Treaty. The letter, which gives meticulous directions for the delivery of the documents, is of considerable interest for the light it sheds on the internal dissension and rivalry between Monroe and Livingston (on their troubled collaboration see Malone, Jefferson the President, pp. 288-290, 298-301 and H. Almon, James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity, 1990, pp. 215-218).

"I commit to your care a letter to Mr. Livingston containing an act of our gov[ernmen]t subjecting to his & my joint disposition a certain sum of money [$2,000,000] to be appropriated to our late treaty with France: also an instrument signed by me to make the appropriation of that money to that object, with a letter to him on the subject. I also commit to your care a letter to Mr. Marbois...in which I inform him that Mr. Livingston's & my power is joint; that I have executed an instrument for the proposed object & inclosed it to Mr. Livingston, on obtaining whose signature the act is complete...I then add to Mr. Marbois that...the consul will find in this procedure a convincing proof of the fair intentions of our gov[ernmen]t to execute the treaty with promptitude & fidelity,...that I am persuaded he will feel the disposition to make a declaration of like confidence in our government...I wish the letters to Mr. Marbois & Mr. Livingston to be delivered immediately...If Mr. Marbois is absent I wish you to call at his office, the treasury, & commit the letter to him...If Mr. L[ivingston] is absent his letter ought not to be committed to the post office. Supposing both absent it will be proper to enclose to Mr. Marbois, his, & inform him that you have one to Mr. L[ivingston], which you wish him to receive without delay...By Mr. M[arbois]'s letter to me it appears that Mr. L[ivingston] had given him reason to believe that he was willing to give the guaranty...By Mr. Livingston's letter to me the contrary is evident. It is possible that Mr. Marbois may have misunderstood him; it is more probable that Mr. Livingston may have written his letter to me in that manner, to throw the whole responsibility of the measure on me, for I cannot think that he will hesitate to sign the guaranty, after what has passed. If he signs & executes the instrument, you will let the affair rest precisely where the above places it. It has been my invariable conduct to give him [Livingston] all the support I could with the French gov[ernmen]t, for the credit of our own and advantage of our citizens, as from motives of delicacy to himself...but, if he refuses then I think it a duty that I owe to our go[vernmen]t, as well as my self to let it be known to the French Go[vernmen]t, that this failure is owing altogether to him: that I have done with the strictest good faith everything that I could. In that case you will show to Mr. Marbois a copy of the act of Congress and the instrument of guaranty signed by me, and give him such other information respecting the transaction...

"It ought not to be suspected that we are trifling with the Go[vernmen]t of France, or gaining time by an idle correspondence. I told Mr. M[arbois]...that I would guaranty that sum, if Mr. L[ivingston] agreed, & I shall not retrace my steps...I still think the measure a wise and proper one & wish it to be carried into effect. If it is not, let the true cause be known: it will then be considered a personal one, which will excite no irritation in French government towards our own. The case will be submitted to our government who will only be responsible afterwards for the part it takes. If Mr. Livingston refuses to execute the act...I do not know...that I can do anything, farther than advise the bankers to advance the money...You may also hint to Mr. M[arbois] that he had better not write me, except by necessity, on this business, for considerations of delicacy..."

Monroe had gone to England to take his post there in July; he and Livingston urged Jefferson to speed the ratification process forward to guard against any attempt by Napoleon to renege on the treaty. Because a down payment would make it more difficult for France to withdraw before ratification, Monroe proposed the use of the special appropriation of $2 million, to which Livingston agreed. Initially the French had declined the offer, but in late August, Barb©e-Marbois had requested it. "Promptly forwarding an order on the British banking firm of Hope & Co..., Monroe was astonished when Livingston refused to approve the advance, because it exceeded their powers...The Minister to France finally signed only because he feared that he might bear the full blame if Napoleon should use their refusal as a justification for withdrawing the cession. Livingston, however, did manage to withhold his signature until news from America made it certain that the treaty would not encounter any difficulties in the Senate. Monroe's willingness to make the advance was rather risky, for the envoys had not been specifically authorized to advance a payment..." (Almon, op. cit., p. 221).