PROPERTY OF A DESCENDANT OF TOBIAS LEAR (1762-1816)
[JEFFERSON, THOMAS BARBARY WARS]. [JEFFERSON, Thomas] A retained secretarial copy of an autograph letter signed to "the Most Illustrious and Most Magnificent Prince the Bey of Tunis", Washington, 27 January 1804. 3 pages, 4to, fine; DAVIS, George. Autograph letter signed ("George Davis"), a retained copy of the original, to Richard Morris, Tunis, 16 September 1803. 2 pages, 4to, very fine; PREBLE, Edward. Autograph letter signed ("Edward Preble"), a retained copy of the original, to "Monsieur Beaussier Charge d'Affairs of the French Republic", "United States Ship Constitution off Tripoly [sic]", 12 June 1804. 2½ pages, 4to.
細節
[JEFFERSON, THOMAS BARBARY WARS]. [JEFFERSON, Thomas] A retained secretarial copy of an autograph letter signed to "the Most Illustrious and Most Magnificent Prince the Bey of Tunis", Washington, 27 January 1804. 3 pages, 4to, fine; DAVIS, George. Autograph letter signed ("George Davis"), a retained copy of the original, to Richard Morris, Tunis, 16 September 1803. 2 pages, 4to, very fine; PREBLE, Edward. Autograph letter signed ("Edward Preble"), a retained copy of the original, to "Monsieur Beaussier Charge d'Affairs of the French Republic", "United States Ship Constitution off Tripoly [sic]", 12 June 1804. 2½ pages, 4to.
NEGOTIATING WITH THE BARBARY PIRATES: DIPLOMACY WITH TRIPOLI AND TUNIS. An engaging correspondance regarding the Barbary states of Triploi and Tunis. For many years, the North African states of Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers and Morocco preyed upon unsuspecting merchant ships in the Meditteranean. President Jefferson was determined to bring a final solution to the problem of the so-called "Barbary Pirates." On September 16th, 1803, George Davis writes to Richard Morris (1768-1815), Commander-in-Chief of the United States Meditteranean Squadron. Davis complains about the American Consul at Tunis and the breakdown of relations: "You will learn that the extravagant passions of Mr. Cathcart, his folly, and ill judged communication to the Bey, has hurried us to the brink of war." The Bey of Tunis twice refused to officially receive James Cathcart (1767-1843). Jefferson was forced to respond to the Bey on 27 January 1804: "I received in due time your...request of a frigate of 36 guns... our naval force being only proportioned to our exigencies, we cannot with prudence lessen it." Jefferson quickly softens the impact by announcing that American intentions have not changed; "We set a just value on your friendship, as we do on that of all other Nations with which we have intercourse and as we presume those nations do on Ours. These mutual friendships...authorize equal expectations, equal claims, and rights on both sides." Jefferson then moves to apologize for Cathcart: "The consideration that the bands of peace between nations ought not to be burst assunder by the hasty and unauthorized acts of a public Agent, was worthy of your wisdom and justice."
While Jefferson sought to smooth relations with Tunis, a crisis emerged in Tripoli. The U.S. ship, the Philadelphia, ran aground on October 31, 1803 and was captured and the crew imprisoned. Now, in June, Preble, the new commander of the Meditteranean fleet, writes to the French Charge d'Affairs in Tripoli concerning Napoleon's intervention on behalf of American prisoners. Preble comments on the extravagance of Tripolitan demands: "The Bashaw's pretentions to the enormous sum you mention, is, on his part a vain one; nor will he ever obtain a tenth part of the it for the randsom [sic]. The negotiation for randsom and Peace must be separate, as we will not pay one dollar for Peace." Preble affirms that peace can only be obtained "on terms consistent with the honor and dignity of the United States" and notes "the blockade must continue while the negotiation is going on, and for ever after, until a treaty of Peace is signed."
NEGOTIATING WITH THE BARBARY PIRATES: DIPLOMACY WITH TRIPOLI AND TUNIS. An engaging correspondance regarding the Barbary states of Triploi and Tunis. For many years, the North African states of Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers and Morocco preyed upon unsuspecting merchant ships in the Meditteranean. President Jefferson was determined to bring a final solution to the problem of the so-called "Barbary Pirates." On September 16th, 1803, George Davis writes to Richard Morris (1768-1815), Commander-in-Chief of the United States Meditteranean Squadron. Davis complains about the American Consul at Tunis and the breakdown of relations: "You will learn that the extravagant passions of Mr. Cathcart, his folly, and ill judged communication to the Bey, has hurried us to the brink of war." The Bey of Tunis twice refused to officially receive James Cathcart (1767-1843). Jefferson was forced to respond to the Bey on 27 January 1804: "I received in due time your...request of a frigate of 36 guns... our naval force being only proportioned to our exigencies, we cannot with prudence lessen it." Jefferson quickly softens the impact by announcing that American intentions have not changed; "We set a just value on your friendship, as we do on that of all other Nations with which we have intercourse and as we presume those nations do on Ours. These mutual friendships...authorize equal expectations, equal claims, and rights on both sides." Jefferson then moves to apologize for Cathcart: "The consideration that the bands of peace between nations ought not to be burst assunder by the hasty and unauthorized acts of a public Agent, was worthy of your wisdom and justice."
While Jefferson sought to smooth relations with Tunis, a crisis emerged in Tripoli. The U.S. ship, the Philadelphia, ran aground on October 31, 1803 and was captured and the crew imprisoned. Now, in June, Preble, the new commander of the Meditteranean fleet, writes to the French Charge d'Affairs in Tripoli concerning Napoleon's intervention on behalf of American prisoners. Preble comments on the extravagance of Tripolitan demands: "The Bashaw's pretentions to the enormous sum you mention, is, on his part a vain one; nor will he ever obtain a tenth part of the it for the randsom [sic]. The negotiation for randsom and Peace must be separate, as we will not pay one dollar for Peace." Preble affirms that peace can only be obtained "on terms consistent with the honor and dignity of the United States" and notes "the blockade must continue while the negotiation is going on, and for ever after, until a treaty of Peace is signed."