Lot Essay
Sold with the recipient's sword, with 33in. slightly-curved fullered blade by HENRY WILKINSON, PALL MALL (Serial Number 24410 indicates date of manufacture 1881), etched with a family Crest, and Motto ANS TACHE steel guard pierced with "Honeysuckle" design, wire-bound fishskin grip and chequered pommel, in its massive wooden-lined brown leather scabbard, with polished steel locket and chape.
This sword is of exceptional interest to edged-weapon specialists, being of a non-regulation pattern peculiar to Regiments commanded by Brigadier-General John Jacob, the celebrated Officer of Bombay Cavalry who in the 1850s successfully pacified the Upper Scinde and Baluchistan provinces of the North West Frontier.
Jacob, who took a keen interest in all aspects of weaponry, was an enthusiastic proponent of Cavalry Sabres designed exclusively for cutting, at a time when the vast majority of Cavalry opinion favoured swords optimised for thrusting. He regarded the massive and steeply-curved blade of the 1796 Pattern Light Cavalry Sabre, obsolete in the British Army after 1822, as the ideal weapon for mounted troops. He was able to procure blades of this type from England, and fitted them with a steel basket guard to give more protection to the hand than was afforded by the plain knucklebow guard of the 1796 Pattern Sword. He also insisted that scabbards should be made of steel to provide the necessary strength, but lined entirely with wood to prevent blunting of the cutting edge of the blade through contact with metal. The Sowars of his two Sillidar Cavalry Regiments (later the 35th Scinde Horse and 36th Jacob's Horse), adopted this weapon with enthusiasm.
In view of Jacob's strong preference for cutting swords, it is surprising to find that two weapons owned by him incorporate blades of the contemporary Cavalry Pattern, virtually identical to that of Lieutenant Salmon's sword, although some three inches longer, as one might expect, given that Salmon was a Rifles Officer rather than a Cavalryman.
Another remarkable feature of Salmon's sword is that it, like the two swords owned by Jacob, has a "Honeysuckle" guard instead of the normal "Gothic" guard incorporating a bugle-horn in the cartouche, which was the regulation pattern for Officers of Rifle Regiments. The Honeysuckle guard is particularly interesting in that it appears on several different and unrelated types of sword: Jacob's swords are an early example, but the same pattern of guard, in gunmetal rather than steel, was adopted by the Royal Engineers in 1857; it was worn by the Carabiniers (6th Dragoon Guards) from 1877 until 1912, and by Field Officers of several Highland Regiments. Why Jacob chose it for his Regiments in preference to the robust and very adequate "Scroll" pattern of guard used by Heavy Cavalry Regiments from 1822, and extended to Light Cavalry in the 1880s, is not clear.
Although Lieutenant Salmon's sword is optimised for thrusting in dismounted combat, it is interesting to note that its scabbard is of the pattern which Jacob himself devised, being of leather-covered steel and lined throughout with wood.
Lieutenant Mordaunt B. Salmon, who numbered among the 15 progeny of Colonel W.A. Salmon, was commissioned as a Sub.-Lieutenant in the 2nd West India Regiment in August 1874, and was transferred on attachment to the 30th Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles) in 1876.
From Quetta, in April 1880, he marched with the Left Wing of Jacob's Rifles to Kandahar, where initially he commanded detachments on the Kandahar-Chaman road, following the tribal attacks on the posts at Gatai and Dubbrai. But on 5.7.1880, he departed that place with Jacob's Rifles as part of the Girishk Field Force - a Brigade comprising E/B Battery, R.H.A., 3rd Scinde Horse, 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, H.Ms 66th (Berkshire) Regiment, 1st Bombay Grenadiers and 30th Jacob's Rifles - which was to support the Wali of Kandahar's troops in halting the advance from Herat of Ayub Khan, pretender to the Afghan throne. At the mutiny of the Wali's troops on 14.7.1880, Salmon was engaged in command of a Company in the skirmish that resulted in the capture of six smooth-bore guns, after which Jacob's Rifles marched with the rest of the Field Force towards Maiwand on 27.7.1880, hoping to beat Ayub Khan to the junction of the Ghazni road at the mouth of the Khakrez Valley.
At about 11 a.m., after a march of several miles under a scorching sun, the Field Force moved through the village of Mundabad and crossed the ravine of the same name to reach an undulating plain where E/B Battery and the smooth-bores went directly into action against Ayub's leading units which could be seen also heading for Maiwand. H.Ms 66th, the Bombay Grenadiers and Jacob's Rifles likewise advanced across the plain with the Cavalry hovering on their left to form a firing line which Ayub soon outflanked by deploying his forces in an enormous horseshoe. Salmon, meanwhile, commanding the Rifles' Baggage-Guard, found himself under the orders of Major Ready of the 66th, some 1500 yards to the rear forming part of a 'V' shaped enclave. At about 12.30, the Baggage Guard having crossed the ravine found itself subjected to a galling fire from Ayub's followers advancing through, and using the cover of Mundabad village. At length, Ready sent forward 2nd Lieutenant Bray of the 66th with 20 men to capture the nearest orchards on the village side of the ravine and drive off the tribesmen:
'At the same time he detached Lieutenant Whitby's Grenadiers and Lieutenant Salmon's Jacob's Rifles Company from the right of his 'V' to clear the ravine. They advanced up the bed driving the tribesmen before them, killing a few and considerably hastening the retreat of the others. Then they swung right up the Mundabad side and took the Afghans escaping from Bray in enfilade, sending them fleeing back to Khig. Thus in a few minutes most of the nuisance areas were in British hands and the annoyance had ceased. The troops were jubilant, morale was at a peak. But they had been in their new positions ... for only a quarter hour when [Lieutenant-Colonel] Malcomson came on the scene and insisted that they withdraw to their original ground. ... Salmon says, "It is needless to observe that the enemy not only speedily reoccupied the gardens and enclosures, but, emboldened by our retirement, came in greater numbers, and the fire we were obliged to sustain was proportionately greater; indeed, it was almost a certainty of being hit if anyone got up from the ground and moved from place to place. Seeing this, the enemy became even bolder, and we were compelled to repel two very determined attacks which were made on the baggage later." '
A little after 2 p.m. the full horror of the disastrous situation on the distant firing line dawned on the Baggage Guard. In the main body of Jacob's Rifles nearly every man had expended his original allotment of ammunition, and their Snider Rifles were so hot that most Sepoys had wrapped cartridge paper around the metal so as to be able to hold them. Suddenly a horde of screaming Ghazis and dense ranks of Kabuli Infantry issued from the cover of a nullah in front of the 66th Foot. The 66th mowed them down in hundreds, until they swung left across the front of Jacob's Rifles. They were heading for the Horse Artillery guns, but some, however, charged beyond the guns into the confused ranks of the Bombay Grenadiers as they attempted to form Company squares. As the Kabuli Infantry and Ghazis took possession of two 9-pounders, Captain Beresford-Pierse of the 66th turned the rear rank of his left Half-Company about in order to fire volleys at them. But just as he was about to give the order to fire, numbers of Sepoys from Jacob's Rifles were forced among his men causing total chaos. At about 3 p.m., a voice called out from the mingled mass of 66th Foot, Jacob's Rifles and Grenadiers, "Let's try that village over there!", and a dazed retreat towards the village of Khig, just 400 yards from Mundabad, began.
The Afghans caught up with the main body after 200 yards and for the next 300 yards a running battle was fought in which 60 British and Indian troops fell. Brigadier-General Burrows galloped up and tried in vain to divert the retreat to Mundabad where he hoped the Baggage Guard was still protecting the baggage behind strong defences. The confused troops did not want to hear and at length Burrows rode off to try and persuade the Cavalry to make another effort. Eventually the Khig group came to their senses and returned a more disciplined fire with the result that only 15 men were lost over the next 500 yards to the near side of the ravine. On reaching it, order was again lost as the survivors literally threw themselves down the bank - an unfortunate Colour-Sergeant impaled himself on his own sword. On the far side of the ravine, Colonel Galbraith of the 66th tried to organise a stand but most of the leading men refused to listen, and, making their way through a series of walled gardens, began to stream towards the Kandahar road.
Salmon and his men were in their poorly selected original positions on the enemy side of the ravine with Captain Quarry's Half-Company of the 66th when the Cavalry dashed through in retreat pursued by large numbers of Afghan horsemen. These latter they managed to keep in check, firing and retiring steadily until they crossed the Mundabad Ravine, South-West of the village:
'There they found a long ditch which gave excellent cover, from which they fired several more volleys at the enemy, who, after some delay, had started to come on in great strength. Salmon and his Company of Jacob's Rifles were also back on the enemy side of the ravine, and like Quarry soon found themselves facing a large enemy force coming straight for the much coveted baggage. The Sepoys behaved coolly and regularly, staying in extended order and firing volley after volley into the advancing crowds with calm deliberation and good effect. Then as the Afghan Cavalry began to outflank, they withdrew across the ravine, the men turning about when directed and firing at the enemy. Here Salmon met Quarry, who had got tired of retreating. "I am going to make a stand here," he said. "I shall not go a step further. Come and make a stand." By this time, however, Salmon's Sepoys were becoming demoralized by the presence of such a great horde of enemy, who had at last brought up their guns and started shelling. They started to melt away, and he might have lost them altogether if it had not been for Subedar-Major Haidar Khan, the Senior Native Officer of Jacob's Rifles, and a terrible man, who had constituted himself as Ready's right-hand man for dealing with Sepoys in the baggage area. The culprits returned, very shaken, to their young British Officer!'
At 4 p.m., with the whole force in disarray, Nuttall, the Cavalry Brigadier, ordered Ready to withdraw with the Baggage Guard and join the fighting retreat to Kandahar. Of Quarry's men only six remained with him at this stage, yet others from different units rallied to him, including some of Salmon's Jacob's Rifles under the redoubtable Subedar-Major Haidar Khan. Four hours later and still miles from the safety of Kandahar Garrison, Salmon was occupied in getting one of the smooth-bore guns (the only one to reach the city) across the Arghandab River under relentless small arms fire. An Officer's account for the Intelligence Department recounts:
'Bullets kept flying over our heads, our position was one of extreme danger, isolated and, a handful as we were, with a gun serving as a fit attraction for the enemy. Lieutenant Salmon and Lieutenant Lawford (of the Transportation Department) I left behind, being determined to bring the gun in, and I rode on. The only way of saving life was to fight our way to Kandahar. Salmon succeeded in bringing the gun into Kandahar - the only smooth-bore to return'.
The 30th Jacob's Rifles meantime left behind the bodies of three out of their six British Officers and some 200 Native Ranks on the field of Maiwand. The remainder returned to Kandahar to man the Bar Durani Gate during the siege by Ayub's forces.
On 15 August, Lieutenant-General J.M. Primrose at Kandahar authorised a sortie against Ayub's forces massing in the villages of Khairabad and Deh Kwajah to the North-East of the city. At 4 a.m. next day, the Cavalry under Nuttall left the city unseen and trotted round to a position South-East of Deh Kwaja to cut off any assistance proffered from other Ghazi encampments when the firing started. At half past five the British Infantry moved out and assaulted Deh Kwaja. Afghan reinforcements attempting to reach the scene of the fighting were at first driven off by the Cavalry, but the British force proved unequal to its self imposed task and the retreat was sounded. The ensuing withdrawal was chaotic and hard pressed. Several Officers watching from the city walls 'without leave dashed from the [Kabul] Gate to help the wounded, while two Medical Officers took stretchers 700 yards back towards Deh Kwaja but could not find any wounded men before they returned'. Salmon, according to Shadbolt, 'Distinguished himself in rescuing wounded men coming in from the sortie to Deh Kwaja (Recommended for Victoria Cross)'. The history of the West India Regiment confirms 'On 16 August he [Salmon] sallied out of the Kabul Gate, under a heavy fire, and with Lieutenant Adie, rescued a wounded man; not content, Salmon went out to assist the wounded again, this time descending the ramparts by a rope ladder ...'
Following service at the Battle of Kandahar on 1 September, in which 30th Jacob's Rifles formed part of the City Reserve, Salmon transferred to the 3rd Queen's Own Bombay Light Cavalry and became Captain in August 1887.
Sources: My God Maiwand, Operations of the South Afghanistan Field Force 1878-80, Leigh Maxwell, 1979; The Afghan Campaign of 1878-1880, S.H. Shadbolt.
This sword is of exceptional interest to edged-weapon specialists, being of a non-regulation pattern peculiar to Regiments commanded by Brigadier-General John Jacob, the celebrated Officer of Bombay Cavalry who in the 1850s successfully pacified the Upper Scinde and Baluchistan provinces of the North West Frontier.
Jacob, who took a keen interest in all aspects of weaponry, was an enthusiastic proponent of Cavalry Sabres designed exclusively for cutting, at a time when the vast majority of Cavalry opinion favoured swords optimised for thrusting. He regarded the massive and steeply-curved blade of the 1796 Pattern Light Cavalry Sabre, obsolete in the British Army after 1822, as the ideal weapon for mounted troops. He was able to procure blades of this type from England, and fitted them with a steel basket guard to give more protection to the hand than was afforded by the plain knucklebow guard of the 1796 Pattern Sword. He also insisted that scabbards should be made of steel to provide the necessary strength, but lined entirely with wood to prevent blunting of the cutting edge of the blade through contact with metal. The Sowars of his two Sillidar Cavalry Regiments (later the 35th Scinde Horse and 36th Jacob's Horse), adopted this weapon with enthusiasm.
In view of Jacob's strong preference for cutting swords, it is surprising to find that two weapons owned by him incorporate blades of the contemporary Cavalry Pattern, virtually identical to that of Lieutenant Salmon's sword, although some three inches longer, as one might expect, given that Salmon was a Rifles Officer rather than a Cavalryman.
Another remarkable feature of Salmon's sword is that it, like the two swords owned by Jacob, has a "Honeysuckle" guard instead of the normal "Gothic" guard incorporating a bugle-horn in the cartouche, which was the regulation pattern for Officers of Rifle Regiments. The Honeysuckle guard is particularly interesting in that it appears on several different and unrelated types of sword: Jacob's swords are an early example, but the same pattern of guard, in gunmetal rather than steel, was adopted by the Royal Engineers in 1857; it was worn by the Carabiniers (6th Dragoon Guards) from 1877 until 1912, and by Field Officers of several Highland Regiments. Why Jacob chose it for his Regiments in preference to the robust and very adequate "Scroll" pattern of guard used by Heavy Cavalry Regiments from 1822, and extended to Light Cavalry in the 1880s, is not clear.
Although Lieutenant Salmon's sword is optimised for thrusting in dismounted combat, it is interesting to note that its scabbard is of the pattern which Jacob himself devised, being of leather-covered steel and lined throughout with wood.
Lieutenant Mordaunt B. Salmon, who numbered among the 15 progeny of Colonel W.A. Salmon, was commissioned as a Sub.-Lieutenant in the 2nd West India Regiment in August 1874, and was transferred on attachment to the 30th Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles) in 1876.
From Quetta, in April 1880, he marched with the Left Wing of Jacob's Rifles to Kandahar, where initially he commanded detachments on the Kandahar-Chaman road, following the tribal attacks on the posts at Gatai and Dubbrai. But on 5.7.1880, he departed that place with Jacob's Rifles as part of the Girishk Field Force - a Brigade comprising E/B Battery, R.H.A., 3rd Scinde Horse, 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, H.Ms 66th (Berkshire) Regiment, 1st Bombay Grenadiers and 30th Jacob's Rifles - which was to support the Wali of Kandahar's troops in halting the advance from Herat of Ayub Khan, pretender to the Afghan throne. At the mutiny of the Wali's troops on 14.7.1880, Salmon was engaged in command of a Company in the skirmish that resulted in the capture of six smooth-bore guns, after which Jacob's Rifles marched with the rest of the Field Force towards Maiwand on 27.7.1880, hoping to beat Ayub Khan to the junction of the Ghazni road at the mouth of the Khakrez Valley.
At about 11 a.m., after a march of several miles under a scorching sun, the Field Force moved through the village of Mundabad and crossed the ravine of the same name to reach an undulating plain where E/B Battery and the smooth-bores went directly into action against Ayub's leading units which could be seen also heading for Maiwand. H.Ms 66th, the Bombay Grenadiers and Jacob's Rifles likewise advanced across the plain with the Cavalry hovering on their left to form a firing line which Ayub soon outflanked by deploying his forces in an enormous horseshoe. Salmon, meanwhile, commanding the Rifles' Baggage-Guard, found himself under the orders of Major Ready of the 66th, some 1500 yards to the rear forming part of a 'V' shaped enclave. At about 12.30, the Baggage Guard having crossed the ravine found itself subjected to a galling fire from Ayub's followers advancing through, and using the cover of Mundabad village. At length, Ready sent forward 2nd Lieutenant Bray of the 66th with 20 men to capture the nearest orchards on the village side of the ravine and drive off the tribesmen:
'At the same time he detached Lieutenant Whitby's Grenadiers and Lieutenant Salmon's Jacob's Rifles Company from the right of his 'V' to clear the ravine. They advanced up the bed driving the tribesmen before them, killing a few and considerably hastening the retreat of the others. Then they swung right up the Mundabad side and took the Afghans escaping from Bray in enfilade, sending them fleeing back to Khig. Thus in a few minutes most of the nuisance areas were in British hands and the annoyance had ceased. The troops were jubilant, morale was at a peak. But they had been in their new positions ... for only a quarter hour when [Lieutenant-Colonel] Malcomson came on the scene and insisted that they withdraw to their original ground. ... Salmon says, "It is needless to observe that the enemy not only speedily reoccupied the gardens and enclosures, but, emboldened by our retirement, came in greater numbers, and the fire we were obliged to sustain was proportionately greater; indeed, it was almost a certainty of being hit if anyone got up from the ground and moved from place to place. Seeing this, the enemy became even bolder, and we were compelled to repel two very determined attacks which were made on the baggage later." '
A little after 2 p.m. the full horror of the disastrous situation on the distant firing line dawned on the Baggage Guard. In the main body of Jacob's Rifles nearly every man had expended his original allotment of ammunition, and their Snider Rifles were so hot that most Sepoys had wrapped cartridge paper around the metal so as to be able to hold them. Suddenly a horde of screaming Ghazis and dense ranks of Kabuli Infantry issued from the cover of a nullah in front of the 66th Foot. The 66th mowed them down in hundreds, until they swung left across the front of Jacob's Rifles. They were heading for the Horse Artillery guns, but some, however, charged beyond the guns into the confused ranks of the Bombay Grenadiers as they attempted to form Company squares. As the Kabuli Infantry and Ghazis took possession of two 9-pounders, Captain Beresford-Pierse of the 66th turned the rear rank of his left Half-Company about in order to fire volleys at them. But just as he was about to give the order to fire, numbers of Sepoys from Jacob's Rifles were forced among his men causing total chaos. At about 3 p.m., a voice called out from the mingled mass of 66th Foot, Jacob's Rifles and Grenadiers, "Let's try that village over there!", and a dazed retreat towards the village of Khig, just 400 yards from Mundabad, began.
The Afghans caught up with the main body after 200 yards and for the next 300 yards a running battle was fought in which 60 British and Indian troops fell. Brigadier-General Burrows galloped up and tried in vain to divert the retreat to Mundabad where he hoped the Baggage Guard was still protecting the baggage behind strong defences. The confused troops did not want to hear and at length Burrows rode off to try and persuade the Cavalry to make another effort. Eventually the Khig group came to their senses and returned a more disciplined fire with the result that only 15 men were lost over the next 500 yards to the near side of the ravine. On reaching it, order was again lost as the survivors literally threw themselves down the bank - an unfortunate Colour-Sergeant impaled himself on his own sword. On the far side of the ravine, Colonel Galbraith of the 66th tried to organise a stand but most of the leading men refused to listen, and, making their way through a series of walled gardens, began to stream towards the Kandahar road.
Salmon and his men were in their poorly selected original positions on the enemy side of the ravine with Captain Quarry's Half-Company of the 66th when the Cavalry dashed through in retreat pursued by large numbers of Afghan horsemen. These latter they managed to keep in check, firing and retiring steadily until they crossed the Mundabad Ravine, South-West of the village:
'There they found a long ditch which gave excellent cover, from which they fired several more volleys at the enemy, who, after some delay, had started to come on in great strength. Salmon and his Company of Jacob's Rifles were also back on the enemy side of the ravine, and like Quarry soon found themselves facing a large enemy force coming straight for the much coveted baggage. The Sepoys behaved coolly and regularly, staying in extended order and firing volley after volley into the advancing crowds with calm deliberation and good effect. Then as the Afghan Cavalry began to outflank, they withdrew across the ravine, the men turning about when directed and firing at the enemy. Here Salmon met Quarry, who had got tired of retreating. "I am going to make a stand here," he said. "I shall not go a step further. Come and make a stand." By this time, however, Salmon's Sepoys were becoming demoralized by the presence of such a great horde of enemy, who had at last brought up their guns and started shelling. They started to melt away, and he might have lost them altogether if it had not been for Subedar-Major Haidar Khan, the Senior Native Officer of Jacob's Rifles, and a terrible man, who had constituted himself as Ready's right-hand man for dealing with Sepoys in the baggage area. The culprits returned, very shaken, to their young British Officer!'
At 4 p.m., with the whole force in disarray, Nuttall, the Cavalry Brigadier, ordered Ready to withdraw with the Baggage Guard and join the fighting retreat to Kandahar. Of Quarry's men only six remained with him at this stage, yet others from different units rallied to him, including some of Salmon's Jacob's Rifles under the redoubtable Subedar-Major Haidar Khan. Four hours later and still miles from the safety of Kandahar Garrison, Salmon was occupied in getting one of the smooth-bore guns (the only one to reach the city) across the Arghandab River under relentless small arms fire. An Officer's account for the Intelligence Department recounts:
'Bullets kept flying over our heads, our position was one of extreme danger, isolated and, a handful as we were, with a gun serving as a fit attraction for the enemy. Lieutenant Salmon and Lieutenant Lawford (of the Transportation Department) I left behind, being determined to bring the gun in, and I rode on. The only way of saving life was to fight our way to Kandahar. Salmon succeeded in bringing the gun into Kandahar - the only smooth-bore to return'.
The 30th Jacob's Rifles meantime left behind the bodies of three out of their six British Officers and some 200 Native Ranks on the field of Maiwand. The remainder returned to Kandahar to man the Bar Durani Gate during the siege by Ayub's forces.
On 15 August, Lieutenant-General J.M. Primrose at Kandahar authorised a sortie against Ayub's forces massing in the villages of Khairabad and Deh Kwajah to the North-East of the city. At 4 a.m. next day, the Cavalry under Nuttall left the city unseen and trotted round to a position South-East of Deh Kwaja to cut off any assistance proffered from other Ghazi encampments when the firing started. At half past five the British Infantry moved out and assaulted Deh Kwaja. Afghan reinforcements attempting to reach the scene of the fighting were at first driven off by the Cavalry, but the British force proved unequal to its self imposed task and the retreat was sounded. The ensuing withdrawal was chaotic and hard pressed. Several Officers watching from the city walls 'without leave dashed from the [Kabul] Gate to help the wounded, while two Medical Officers took stretchers 700 yards back towards Deh Kwaja but could not find any wounded men before they returned'. Salmon, according to Shadbolt, 'Distinguished himself in rescuing wounded men coming in from the sortie to Deh Kwaja (Recommended for Victoria Cross)'. The history of the West India Regiment confirms 'On 16 August he [Salmon] sallied out of the Kabul Gate, under a heavy fire, and with Lieutenant Adie, rescued a wounded man; not content, Salmon went out to assist the wounded again, this time descending the ramparts by a rope ladder ...'
Following service at the Battle of Kandahar on 1 September, in which 30th Jacob's Rifles formed part of the City Reserve, Salmon transferred to the 3rd Queen's Own Bombay Light Cavalry and became Captain in August 1887.
Sources: My God Maiwand, Operations of the South Afghanistan Field Force 1878-80, Leigh Maxwell, 1979; The Afghan Campaign of 1878-1880, S.H. Shadbolt.