![LEE, Robert E. (1807-1870), General, Confederate States of America. Autograph letter signed ("R.E. Lee") to General John C. Breckinridge, "Hdqrs. Army N. Virga.", [Orange Court House, Virginia], 11 April 1864. 2 pages, 4to (9¾ x 8 in.), browned, slight separation at horizontal fold, professionally repaired, tiny loss in lower right corner affects signature.](https://www.christies.com/img/LotImages/2002/NYR/2002_NYR_01139_0114_000(050307).jpg?w=1)
細節
LEE, Robert E. (1807-1870), General, Confederate States of America. Autograph letter signed ("R.E. Lee") to General John C. Breckinridge, "Hdqrs. Army N. Virga.", [Orange Court House, Virginia], 11 April 1864. 2 pages, 4to (9¾ x 8 in.), browned, slight separation at horizontal fold, professionally repaired, tiny loss in lower right corner affects signature.
"THE GREAT STRUGGLE WILL TAKE PLACE IN VIRGINIA": LEE PREPARES FOR THE LAST GREAT CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
A superb wartime letter giving insight into Lee's perceptive analysis of enemy strategy, his concerns about the approaching campaign, and his strategy to counter the massive Union advance into Virginia that would eventually end the war. On numerous occasions, the generals of the Army of the Potomac led that great army into Virginia, confidently predicting victory and the capture of Richmond, only to be smartly defeated by the brilliant generalship of Robert E. Lee. As commander-in-chief, Lincoln was saddled with generals who failed to grasp the broad strategic issues necessary to defeat the Confederacy. The appointment of Ulysses S. Grant as General-in-Chief promised a different type of war. Grant developed a national strategy that put pressure upon the Confederacy at multiple points; he posted his own headquarters with the Army, so he could personally direct field operations against Lee. Reversing a course pursued by his predecessors, Grant saw Richmond as only a secondary objective, and set out to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia in an unrelenting campaign. He intended to "hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him" (Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness, p. 46).
Grant planned a massive offensive for the Spring of 1865. The Army of Potomac would move against Lee's army; an army under Butler would move up the James River towards Richmond; an army under Sigel would operate in the Shenandoah Valley. Less than a month before the Spring campaign commenced, Lee observed Grant's preparations with growing concern. Here, he writes to Breckinridge, Confederate commander in the Valley: "Present indications render it more than probable that on the opening of the campaign by the enemy, a combined effort will be made for the capture of Richmond, & the great struggle will take place in Virga. Troops are apparently concentrating on the Rapp[ahannoc]k & the waters of the Chesapeake." Lee noted the return of Union troops that had been operating in Tennessee and Georgia: "There is but little doubt...that the 9th Corps, to which other troops are added, is now in the vicinity of Annapolis under Genl. [Ambrose] Burnside. The 11th & 19th Corps have been consolidated into the 20th under Genl. [Joseph] Hooker, & is reported to have been ordered to Genl. [George] Meade [these troops actually remained in Georgia]." He points out that large units are being brought to the front: "All the White troops that can be spared have been ordered from the line of the B&O RR, & the entrenchments around Alex[andri]a & brought up to the Rapp[ahannoc]k. Their places being supplied by blacks. Other reinforcements have been made...& I think it probable...that the siege of Charleston will be suspended, & certain troops & iron clad steamers transferred to the James river."
Seeking tactics to counter the developing Union campaign, Lee suggests that Breckinridge deflect the Union thrust: "To carry out this plan, points in other parts of the country must be weakened, of which we should take advantage. [General James] Longstreet has reported that the 9th & 23rd Corps had left Knoxville, marching via Cumberland Gap. I do not know the present strength of the enemy in E. Tennessee, but should it not exceed the combined forces of yourself & Genl. [Simon] Buckner, important advantages might be obtained there. Again should he have drawn a portion of his forces from N.W. Virga. or exposed any part of the long line of the B&O RR a combination with Genl. [John] Imboden might enable you to strike a serious blow in that direction, interrupt his communications & draw off some of his troops from the main attack...If you can by the commencement of active operations by the enemy have completed the defences guarding the main approaches of your line & organized the local troops as garrisons, you will be able to employ your active forces where they can be most advantageous in thwarting his general plans." Lee concludes with a warning: "When his main movement takes place, we must be prepared for feigned attacks on many fronts and not be misled by them."
The Union campaign began in earnest in early May. Grant's massive army crossed the Rapidan River on May 4, and by the next day, some of the bloodiest battles of the war had begun, in a sparsely settled area known locally as the Wilderness (see following lot, and Lincoln's reaction to the sobering human toll of the battles in lot 116).
"THE GREAT STRUGGLE WILL TAKE PLACE IN VIRGINIA": LEE PREPARES FOR THE LAST GREAT CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR
A superb wartime letter giving insight into Lee's perceptive analysis of enemy strategy, his concerns about the approaching campaign, and his strategy to counter the massive Union advance into Virginia that would eventually end the war. On numerous occasions, the generals of the Army of the Potomac led that great army into Virginia, confidently predicting victory and the capture of Richmond, only to be smartly defeated by the brilliant generalship of Robert E. Lee. As commander-in-chief, Lincoln was saddled with generals who failed to grasp the broad strategic issues necessary to defeat the Confederacy. The appointment of Ulysses S. Grant as General-in-Chief promised a different type of war. Grant developed a national strategy that put pressure upon the Confederacy at multiple points; he posted his own headquarters with the Army, so he could personally direct field operations against Lee. Reversing a course pursued by his predecessors, Grant saw Richmond as only a secondary objective, and set out to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia in an unrelenting campaign. He intended to "hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him" (Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness, p. 46).
Grant planned a massive offensive for the Spring of 1865. The Army of Potomac would move against Lee's army; an army under Butler would move up the James River towards Richmond; an army under Sigel would operate in the Shenandoah Valley. Less than a month before the Spring campaign commenced, Lee observed Grant's preparations with growing concern. Here, he writes to Breckinridge, Confederate commander in the Valley: "Present indications render it more than probable that on the opening of the campaign by the enemy, a combined effort will be made for the capture of Richmond, & the great struggle will take place in Virg
Seeking tactics to counter the developing Union campaign, Lee suggests that Breckinridge deflect the Union thrust: "To carry out this plan, points in other parts of the country must be weakened, of which we should take advantage. [General James] Longstreet has reported that the 9th & 23rd Corps had left Knoxville, marching via Cumberland Gap. I do not know the present strength of the enemy in E. Tennessee, but should it not exceed the combined forces of yourself & Genl. [Simon] Buckner, important advantages might be obtained there. Again should he have drawn a portion of his forces from N.W. Virg
The Union campaign began in earnest in early May. Grant's massive army crossed the Rapidan River on May 4, and by the next day, some of the bloodiest battles of the war had begun, in a sparsely settled area known locally as the Wilderness (see following lot, and Lincoln's reaction to the sobering human toll of the battles in lot 116).