LEE, Robert E. (1807-1870), General, C.S.A. Autograph letter signed ("R. E. Lee") TO GENERAL J. E. B. STUART, Headquarters near Richmond, 4 June 1862. 1 p., 4to, blue ruled paper, discrete mends on verso.
LEE, Robert E. (1807-1870), General, C.S.A. Autograph letter signed ("R. E. Lee") TO GENERAL J. E. B. STUART, Headquarters near Richmond, 4 June 1862. 1 p., 4to, blue ruled paper, discrete mends on verso.

細節
LEE, Robert E. (1807-1870), General, C.S.A. Autograph letter signed ("R. E. Lee") TO GENERAL J. E. B. STUART, Headquarters near Richmond, 4 June 1862. 1 p., 4to, blue ruled paper, discrete mends on verso.

LEE TAKES COMMAND BEFORE THE SEVEN DAYS BATTLES AND DESCRIBES HIS STRATEGY TO STUART: "MY WISH IS TO ATTACK HIM WHENEVER HE MOVES...I HAVE NO EXPECTATION OF THE ENEMY ATTACKING US"

Lee was only four days back in the field, having left his desk job as Jefferson Davis's military advisor to replace the wounded Joseph E. Johnston and take the reigns of the Army of Northern Virginia. He has already taken the measure of his unaggressive adversary, General George B. McClellan in this letter to J. E. B. Stuart, in which he also sets forth his offensive-defensive strategy: "I am very much obliged to you for your letter of this Morng. It needed no apology & I am happy to interchange views with all my brother officers. Your ideas agree with mine & I have no expectation of the enemy attacking us in the field but of carrying on a battle of posts & positions. We must build this up & attack him. But not in his entrenchments. It is stated on the left & I think believed by Genls. Magruder, McLaws, Whiting, &c. that his entrenchments there are now too strong for us to attack & were last Saturday [at the Battle of Seven Pines]. Others have been seen behind the one that accosted us & it is believed there is a system behind those carried by Longstreet which he would have run against had he pursued his course further. If this is so can it be ascertained? My wish is to attack him whenever he moves or if he is not secure we could attack him now. Can you find out & whether there is sufficient rain fallen to flood the passages of the Chickahominy. He has constructed several bridges below New Bridge, behind the position in which he was fought Saturday."

Lee's first tour of battle duty in West Virginia in 1861 had been a flop. "Evacuating Lee" was the sarcastic sobriquet used by the Richmond Examiner to greet the new commander. And McClellan, in a breathtaking example of psychological projection, dismissed his adversary as "cautious and weak under grave responsibility...likely to be timid and irresolute in action" (McPherson, 462). Unlike McClellan, Lee knew precisely how he wanted to use his forces. His offensive-defensive strategy (build up defenses and "attack him. But not in his entrenchments") was exactly the right Southern blueprint at that time. In order to win foreign recognition and sustain Southern independence, Confederate forces had to make the war too costly for the North to continue. So that meant inflicting painful losses on the Union armies yet preserving his forces by avoiding an all-or-nothing battle on the enemy's terms. He used Jeb Stuart and Stonewall Jackson to harass the sluggish and more cautious Union forces, while Lee bled McClellan and his hapless successors throughout the course of 1862 and early 1863, from the Sevens Days Battle to Chancellorsville.