Details
McCLELLAN, George B. (1826-1885), General, U. S. Army. Autograph letter signed ("Geo. B. McClellan") to Gen. Henry W. Halleck, Barrett's Ferry, Chickahominy, 7: 30 p.m., 17 August 1862. 2 pp., 4to, ruled paper, small closed tear at fold.
MCCLELLAN PREPARES TO EVACUATE THE PENINSULA AND VOWS "SO LONG AS I REMAIN IN COMMAND OF THIS ARMY I WILL FAITHFULLY CARRY OUT THE NEW PROGRAMME."
MCCLELLAN CLEARS THE AIR WITH HALLECK IN THE LEAD-UP TO SECOND MANASSAS. A remarkable letter--frank and blunt--in which McClellan reveals his suspicions towards Halleck. "I have had this morning a full conversation with Genl. Burnside. To be perfectly frank with you I must say that I did think from some of your recent telegrams that you were not disposed to treat me in a candid or friendly manner. This was the more grating to me because I was conscious that although I differed from you in opinion I had done so with entire frankness & loyalty, & that I had not delayed one moment in preparing to carry out your orders. I am glad to say that Burnside has satisfied me that you are still my friend. In return I think he can satisfy you that I have loyally carried out your instructions, although my own judgment was not in accordance with yours. Let the past take care of itself. So long as I remain in command of this army I will faithfully carry out the new programme. I feel quite confident that I will have everything across the Chicakahominy by daylight. If all is then quiet I will regard my command as normally safe & will feel justified in moving it solely with reference to its speedy embarkation."
The "new programme" was to get McClellan off the Peninsula, where he lingered after the Seven Days Battle, and south to the Rappahannock to link up with Pope, who was being threatened by Stonewall Jackson. As usual, McClellan was taking his time about it, and orders from Halleck at the beginning of August were still not carried out by the middle of the month. The conversation with Burnside was Halleck's try at offering a carrot after so many unheeded sticks. If McClellan moved to aid Pope, Burnside reported, Halleck was prepared to grant McClellan overall command of all armies in Virginia. Typically, McClellan refrained from committing two of his divisions that might have aided Pope. The whole affair was a fiasco. Pope was forced to retreat, and the recriminations and blame shifting--about which McClellan was never slow--began in earnest.
MCCLELLAN PREPARES TO EVACUATE THE PENINSULA AND VOWS "SO LONG AS I REMAIN IN COMMAND OF THIS ARMY I WILL FAITHFULLY CARRY OUT THE NEW PROGRAMME."
MCCLELLAN CLEARS THE AIR WITH HALLECK IN THE LEAD-UP TO SECOND MANASSAS. A remarkable letter--frank and blunt--in which McClellan reveals his suspicions towards Halleck. "I have had this morning a full conversation with Genl. Burnside. To be perfectly frank with you I must say that I did think from some of your recent telegrams that you were not disposed to treat me in a candid or friendly manner. This was the more grating to me because I was conscious that although I differed from you in opinion I had done so with entire frankness & loyalty, & that I had not delayed one moment in preparing to carry out your orders. I am glad to say that Burnside has satisfied me that you are still my friend. In return I think he can satisfy you that I have loyally carried out your instructions, although my own judgment was not in accordance with yours. Let the past take care of itself. So long as I remain in command of this army I will faithfully carry out the new programme. I feel quite confident that I will have everything across the Chicakahominy by daylight. If all is then quiet I will regard my command as normally safe & will feel justified in moving it solely with reference to its speedy embarkation."
The "new programme" was to get McClellan off the Peninsula, where he lingered after the Seven Days Battle, and south to the Rappahannock to link up with Pope, who was being threatened by Stonewall Jackson. As usual, McClellan was taking his time about it, and orders from Halleck at the beginning of August were still not carried out by the middle of the month. The conversation with Burnside was Halleck's try at offering a carrot after so many unheeded sticks. If McClellan moved to aid Pope, Burnside reported, Halleck was prepared to grant McClellan overall command of all armies in Virginia. Typically, McClellan refrained from committing two of his divisions that might have aided Pope. The whole affair was a fiasco. Pope was forced to retreat, and the recriminations and blame shifting--about which McClellan was never slow--began in earnest.