細節
HARRISON, Benjamin (1833-1901), President. Letter signed ("Benj. Harrison"), as President, to L. E. Quigg, Washington, 9 October 1891. 2½ pages, 4to, Executive Mansion stationery, signature page backed to another sheet.
HARRISON'S THOUGHTS ON THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF SILVER CURRENCY: A HARRISON PRESIDENTIAL LETTER
Harrison writes to a New Yorker on the pressing question of the nation's currency. Harrison returns Quigg's paper on "Silver in Our Currency" with apologies saying he has found it "impossible to get the time to make a very close or critical examination" of it, but he has nevertheless "made a suggestion or two" as a "result of a hasty reading." Harrison thinks "we must regard the legislation of the last Congress as experimental. How long the present purchases of silver can be continued in the absence of any larger use of silver by European governments I do not know, nor do I think anybody does. Perhaps something should be said, in the article you have written, in this line, and of our earnest efforts to promote an international agreement. I think too that the ill effects of free coinage at this time should be set out and that the purpose to make every dollar as good as any dollar issued should be discarded." Harrison goes on to say that workers will lose out with the adoption of an inflated silver currency. While businesses and banks could use the powers of the courts to compel the enforcement of contracts and the payment of debts in gold, "the workman must be content to accept a promise to pay him in dollars, which will inevitably be discharged by the use of the depreciated dollar, if there is one."
That got to the heart of the political problem at stake in the silver disputes. Farmers and workers wanted an inflated, silver-based currency to break the political and economic power of the big banks and businesses, which controlled the gold supply. In a concession to the silver forces, Congress in 1890 passed the Sherman Silver Purchase Act (to which Harrison here refers). It compelled the government to buy 4.5 million ounces of silver every month. The Treasury Department would buy that silver bullion with paper notes that could then be redeemed for either silver or gold. Not surprisingly, people opted almost exclusively for gold payment, seriously depleting the nation's gold reserves, and helping bring on the devastating depression of 1893-1897.
HARRISON'S THOUGHTS ON THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF SILVER CURRENCY: A HARRISON PRESIDENTIAL LETTER
Harrison writes to a New Yorker on the pressing question of the nation's currency. Harrison returns Quigg's paper on "Silver in Our Currency" with apologies saying he has found it "impossible to get the time to make a very close or critical examination" of it, but he has nevertheless "made a suggestion or two" as a "result of a hasty reading." Harrison thinks "we must regard the legislation of the last Congress as experimental. How long the present purchases of silver can be continued in the absence of any larger use of silver by European governments I do not know, nor do I think anybody does. Perhaps something should be said, in the article you have written, in this line, and of our earnest efforts to promote an international agreement. I think too that the ill effects of free coinage at this time should be set out and that the purpose to make every dollar as good as any dollar issued should be discarded." Harrison goes on to say that workers will lose out with the adoption of an inflated silver currency. While businesses and banks could use the powers of the courts to compel the enforcement of contracts and the payment of debts in gold, "the workman must be content to accept a promise to pay him in dollars, which will inevitably be discharged by the use of the depreciated dollar, if there is one."
That got to the heart of the political problem at stake in the silver disputes. Farmers and workers wanted an inflated, silver-based currency to break the political and economic power of the big banks and businesses, which controlled the gold supply. In a concession to the silver forces, Congress in 1890 passed the Sherman Silver Purchase Act (to which Harrison here refers). It compelled the government to buy 4.5 million ounces of silver every month. The Treasury Department would buy that silver bullion with paper notes that could then be redeemed for either silver or gold. Not surprisingly, people opted almost exclusively for gold payment, seriously depleting the nation's gold reserves, and helping bring on the devastating depression of 1893-1897.