![[MUNICH CRISIS]. CHAMBERLAIN, (Arthur) Neville (1869-1940), British Prime Minister. Three typed letters signed ("Neville Chamberlain"), as Prime Minister, TO ADOLF HITLER, London and Bad Godesberg, Germany, 23- 26 September 1938. Together 11 pages, 4to, Prime Ministers stationery, three punch holes along left edges, some clerical notes in margins.](https://www.christies.com/img/LotImages/2007/NYR/2007_NYR_01840_0134_000(020219).jpg?w=1)
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[MUNICH CRISIS]. CHAMBERLAIN, (Arthur) Neville (1869-1940), British Prime Minister. Three typed letters signed ("Neville Chamberlain"), as Prime Minister, TO ADOLF HITLER, London and Bad Godesberg, Germany, 23- 26 September 1938. Together 11 pages, 4to, Prime Ministers stationery, three punch holes along left edges, some clerical notes in margins.
"...THE SUDETEN GERMAN AREAS ARE TO JOIN THE REICH"
Three crucial letters from the Munich crisis, as Chamberlain desperately tries to appease Hitler and avoid war over Czechoslovakia. On 15 September Chamberlain dramatically flew to Berchtesgaden to meet with Hitler, where he agreed in principle to the Fuhrer's demand that the German-populated Sudeten region be ceded to the Reich. The French were on board, and together London and Paris rammed the humiliating agreement down the throats of the Czechs. A confident Chamberlain returns to Bad Godesberg on 23 September to conclude what he thought would be a final agreement. But Hitler drops a bombshell: he wants Czech compliance by 1 October, and German troops would enter the Sudeten lands on 28 September.
A dumbfounded Chamberlain tells Hitler, "Even if I felt it right to put this proposal to the Czech Government, I am convinced that they would not regard it as being in the spirit of the arrangement which we and the French Government urged them to accept and which they have accepted. In the event of German troops moving into the areas as you propose, there is no doubt that the Czech Government would have no option but to order their forces to resist, and this would mean the destruction of the basis upon which you and I a week ago agreed to work together, namely, an orderly settlement of this question rather than a settlement by the use of force....There must surely be alternatives to your proposal which would not be open to the objections I have pointed out." Chamberlain pleads with Hitler to understand that this ugly deed has to be packaged in such a way that "public opinion in my country, in France, and indeed, in the world generally" will see it "as carrying out the principles already agreed upon in an orderly fashion and free from the threat of force."
Hitler wouldn't budge, and in the second of our three letters, written later in the day on 23 September, Chamberlain makes this cool response: He will pass Germany's demands on to the Czechs, but in the face of Berlin's intransigence, further talks are pointless. "I do not see that I can perform any further service here, whilst on the other hand it has become necessary that I should at once report the present situation to my colleagues and to the French Government. I propose, therefore, to return to England." In the 26 September letter he reports back to Hitler that the Czechs, as expected, are outraged (at himself--he might have added--as well as Hitler). They "would be deprived," he says, "of every safeguard for her national existence...Her national and economic independence would automatically disappear with the acceptance of the German plan. The whole process of moving the population is to be reduced to panic flight." He clings to the hope that war can be avoided: "Your Excellency and I are in complete agreement as to the imperative necessity to maintain the peace of Europe...Then surely the tragic consequences of a conflict ought not to be incurred over a difference in method..."
Chamberlain dispatches Horace Wilson to Berlin on the 27th, but Hitler shrieks out his determination for war. But then he pulls back, convening a conference at Munich on 29-30 September with Chamberlain, Mussolini, and French premier Daladier. The Czechs, again, were left to await their fate. Under the final terms, population transfers were to be completed by 10 October. An international force would patrol the disputed regions until a fig-leaf plebiscite would formally transfer control to Germany. Back in England, Chamberlain famously waived Hitler's signature on a piece of paper, later declaring it "peace in our time." But the scales were dropped from his eyes. Hitler was clearly a madman, and war inevitable. Yet Chamberlain saw these agreements as buying precious time for Britain, at the expense--he cynically reported to the House of Commons--of "a far-away country" and a "people of whom we know nothing." Together 3 items.
Provenance: J. A. Stargardt, 23 March 1983, lot 1103. (3)
"...THE SUDETEN GERMAN AREAS ARE TO JOIN THE REICH"
Three crucial letters from the Munich crisis, as Chamberlain desperately tries to appease Hitler and avoid war over Czechoslovakia. On 15 September Chamberlain dramatically flew to Berchtesgaden to meet with Hitler, where he agreed in principle to the Fuhrer's demand that the German-populated Sudeten region be ceded to the Reich. The French were on board, and together London and Paris rammed the humiliating agreement down the throats of the Czechs. A confident Chamberlain returns to Bad Godesberg on 23 September to conclude what he thought would be a final agreement. But Hitler drops a bombshell: he wants Czech compliance by 1 October, and German troops would enter the Sudeten lands on 28 September.
A dumbfounded Chamberlain tells Hitler, "Even if I felt it right to put this proposal to the Czech Government, I am convinced that they would not regard it as being in the spirit of the arrangement which we and the French Government urged them to accept and which they have accepted. In the event of German troops moving into the areas as you propose, there is no doubt that the Czech Government would have no option but to order their forces to resist, and this would mean the destruction of the basis upon which you and I a week ago agreed to work together, namely, an orderly settlement of this question rather than a settlement by the use of force....There must surely be alternatives to your proposal which would not be open to the objections I have pointed out." Chamberlain pleads with Hitler to understand that this ugly deed has to be packaged in such a way that "public opinion in my country, in France, and indeed, in the world generally" will see it "as carrying out the principles already agreed upon in an orderly fashion and free from the threat of force."
Hitler wouldn't budge, and in the second of our three letters, written later in the day on 23 September, Chamberlain makes this cool response: He will pass Germany's demands on to the Czechs, but in the face of Berlin's intransigence, further talks are pointless. "I do not see that I can perform any further service here, whilst on the other hand it has become necessary that I should at once report the present situation to my colleagues and to the French Government. I propose, therefore, to return to England." In the 26 September letter he reports back to Hitler that the Czechs, as expected, are outraged (at himself--he might have added--as well as Hitler). They "would be deprived," he says, "of every safeguard for her national existence...Her national and economic independence would automatically disappear with the acceptance of the German plan. The whole process of moving the population is to be reduced to panic flight." He clings to the hope that war can be avoided: "Your Excellency and I are in complete agreement as to the imperative necessity to maintain the peace of Europe...Then surely the tragic consequences of a conflict ought not to be incurred over a difference in method..."
Chamberlain dispatches Horace Wilson to Berlin on the 27th, but Hitler shrieks out his determination for war. But then he pulls back, convening a conference at Munich on 29-30 September with Chamberlain, Mussolini, and French premier Daladier. The Czechs, again, were left to await their fate. Under the final terms, population transfers were to be completed by 10 October. An international force would patrol the disputed regions until a fig-leaf plebiscite would formally transfer control to Germany. Back in England, Chamberlain famously waived Hitler's signature on a piece of paper, later declaring it "peace in our time." But the scales were dropped from his eyes. Hitler was clearly a madman, and war inevitable. Yet Chamberlain saw these agreements as buying precious time for Britain, at the expense--he cynically reported to the House of Commons--of "a far-away country" and a "people of whom we know nothing." Together 3 items.
Provenance: J. A. Stargardt, 23 March 1983, lot 1103. (3)