.jpg?w=1)
THE PROPERTY OF A LADY
LINCOLN, Abraham (1808-1865), President. Autograph letter signed ("A. Lincoln"), as President, TO GENERAL GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Washington, 27 October 1862. 1 page, 8vo, small repair on verso, tipped at left edge to another sheet.
Details
LINCOLN, Abraham (1808-1865), President. Autograph letter signed ("A. Lincoln"), as President, TO GENERAL GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Washington, 27 October 1862. 1 page, 8vo, small repair on verso, tipped at left edge to another sheet.
"IS IT YOUR PURPOSE NOT TO GO INTO ACTION?"
AN EXASPERATED LINCOLN CONFRONTS MCCLELLAN NINE DAYS BEFORE FIRING HIM. The President received a dispatch from McClellan earlier that day in which the General claimed his regiments were so reduced that new conscripts were needed to "fill up these skeletons before taking them again into action." Lincoln's anger and exasperation is palpable: "And now," he writes, "I ask a distinct answer to the question 'Is it your purpose not to go into action again till the men now being drafted in the states are incorporated into the old regiments?'" McClellan responded that the phrase "before taking them into action" was added by an aide, without his authorization. "I answer distinctly that I have not and have not had any idea of postponing the advance..." (Sears, ed., Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan, 511-512).
This letter comes five weeks after the great battle at Antietam, when McClellan--his headquarters miles to the rear--declined to send in his last reserves in order to exploit a breach in the center of Lee's line. It comes three weeks after Lincoln visited McClellan's headquarters at Harper's Ferry where, surveying the vast Union Army encampment from a hilltop, the President quipped sarcastically to O. M. Hatch, "This is General McClellan's bodyguard." And it comes after nearly two full years of frustration over McClellan's case of "the slows"--his consistent unwillingness to pursue and engage Lee's army until he had ever more reinforcements. Yet even his 100,000-man strong force failed to destroy Lee's smaller army or capture Richmond in the spring fighting of 1862. Lincoln replaced McClellan with Pope in June 1862, but restored him to command just before Antietam, over the strenuous objection of his Cabinet. The President recognized that what McClellan lacked in fighting spirit--and in respect for his Commander-in-Chief--he made up for in organizational and leadership abilities. The men greatly respected him, and McClellan made them into a well-trained, professional fighting force. Which made it all the more frustrating that he would not use them. McClellan was "an admirable engineer," Lincoln said, "but he seems to have a special talent for a stationary engine" (Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, 178).
Even when McClellan got hold of Lee's battle plans on 13 September, he dithered long enough for Lee to learn of the security breach and adjust. Antietam was enough of a victory for Lincoln to issue the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. But it might have been decisive. Afterwards, McClellan reverted to form and would take no action unless restocked with fresh cavalry horses. "Will you pardon me for asking," Lincoln wrote on 25 October, "what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?" (Nicolay and Hay, 8:67) On 30 October, McClellan was finally on the move, but it took him several days to cross the Potomac. Lee did it in one. And the excuses were starting again: "No greater mistake has been made than the total failure to reinforce the old regiments," he told Lincoln on 30 October. "I write this only to place the responsibility where it belongs..." (Sears, 516) He did not mean himself. On 5 November Lincoln sacked him for good.
An important letter in the final showdown with this exasperating general. Published in Basler 5:479.
"IS IT YOUR PURPOSE NOT TO GO INTO ACTION?"
AN EXASPERATED LINCOLN CONFRONTS MCCLELLAN NINE DAYS BEFORE FIRING HIM. The President received a dispatch from McClellan earlier that day in which the General claimed his regiments were so reduced that new conscripts were needed to "fill up these skeletons before taking them again into action." Lincoln's anger and exasperation is palpable: "And now," he writes, "I ask a distinct answer to the question 'Is it your purpose not to go into action again till the men now being drafted in the states are incorporated into the old regiments?'" McClellan responded that the phrase "before taking them into action" was added by an aide, without his authorization. "I answer distinctly that I have not and have not had any idea of postponing the advance..." (Sears, ed., Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan, 511-512).
This letter comes five weeks after the great battle at Antietam, when McClellan--his headquarters miles to the rear--declined to send in his last reserves in order to exploit a breach in the center of Lee's line. It comes three weeks after Lincoln visited McClellan's headquarters at Harper's Ferry where, surveying the vast Union Army encampment from a hilltop, the President quipped sarcastically to O. M. Hatch, "This is General McClellan's bodyguard." And it comes after nearly two full years of frustration over McClellan's case of "the slows"--his consistent unwillingness to pursue and engage Lee's army until he had ever more reinforcements. Yet even his 100,000-man strong force failed to destroy Lee's smaller army or capture Richmond in the spring fighting of 1862. Lincoln replaced McClellan with Pope in June 1862, but restored him to command just before Antietam, over the strenuous objection of his Cabinet. The President recognized that what McClellan lacked in fighting spirit--and in respect for his Commander-in-Chief--he made up for in organizational and leadership abilities. The men greatly respected him, and McClellan made them into a well-trained, professional fighting force. Which made it all the more frustrating that he would not use them. McClellan was "an admirable engineer," Lincoln said, "but he seems to have a special talent for a stationary engine" (Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, 178).
Even when McClellan got hold of Lee's battle plans on 13 September, he dithered long enough for Lee to learn of the security breach and adjust. Antietam was enough of a victory for Lincoln to issue the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. But it might have been decisive. Afterwards, McClellan reverted to form and would take no action unless restocked with fresh cavalry horses. "Will you pardon me for asking," Lincoln wrote on 25 October, "what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?" (Nicolay and Hay, 8:67) On 30 October, McClellan was finally on the move, but it took him several days to cross the Potomac. Lee did it in one. And the excuses were starting again: "No greater mistake has been made than the total failure to reinforce the old regiments," he told Lincoln on 30 October. "I write this only to place the responsibility where it belongs..." (Sears, 516) He did not mean himself. On 5 November Lincoln sacked him for good.
An important letter in the final showdown with this exasperating general. Published in Basler 5:479.