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Series of 31 letters to Lieutenant-General Sir William Stewart and others, Portugal, Spain, France and London, 1810-121
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Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington (1769-1852)
Series of 31 letters to Lieutenant-General Sir William Stewart and others, Portugal, Spain, France and London, 1810-121
The correspondence comprises 27 autograph letters signed, three draft autograph letters (one imperfect) and six letters signed by Wellington, the majority to Lieutenant-General Sir William Stewart, with others to Colonel [later General Sir Warren] Peacocke (1), Charles Arbuthnot (as secretary of the Treasury, 1) and General Rowland Hill (later 1st Viscount Hill, 3 letters), Viseu, Torres Vedras, Mafra, Lisbon, Cartaxo, 'Between Elvas and Badajos', 'Villa de Toro, near Burgos', Fresneda, Lesaka, St Jean de Luz and London, 24 January 1810 - 22 November 1813 and 10 March 1821
Together 30 pages in autograph and 29 pages in a secretarial hand; with single letters by James Bathurst, General Carlos de España, Lord FitzRoy Somerset [later 1st Baron Raglan], General Hill and Henry Bathurst, 3rd Earl Bathurst, and seven copy letters. Interleaved in a copy of Official Correspondence between Field-Marshal His Grace the Duke of Wellington and Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir William Stewart K.C.B. etc, 1810-1821, [Edinburgh, 1871], privately printed in 50 copies, the letters bound in preceding their printed transcriptions. 19th-century purple roan. Provenance: Horatio Granville Murray Stewart (1834-1904, grandson of the recipient: bookplate); Christie's, 26 June 1991, lot 375.
Wellington in the Peninsula: discipline, supplies and strategy. The early letters to Stewart instruct him to take charge of the defence of Cadiz, giving orders on how to proceed if Cadiz is surrendered, and recommending 'a good understanding with the Spanish officers', in a later letter underlining the importance of convincing the Spaniards of the necessity for cooperation, although he writes critically of the Spanish approach ('The misfortune throughout the war has been, that the Spaniards are of a disposition too sanguine'), of their strategy and of the condition of their army ('The cavalry in particular is lamentably deficient in discipline'). His pessimism is summed up in a letter of 27 March 1810: 'The affairs of the Peninsula have invariably had the same appearance since I have known them; they have always appeared to be lost; means have always appeared inadequate to their objects ...'.
The letters show Wellington's constant attention to discipline, supplies and logistics, and his struggles to impose order: in a letter to Hill on 29 November 1810 he is particularly critical of the conduct of the French-born Spanish General Carlos de España: 'I have had more trouble with Don Carlos d'Espagne, & his Provisions than I have with those of the whole Army; & I am sorry to observe from a letter which Marshall Sir Wm Beresford has put into my hands that Don Carlos has threatened to make his Soldiers take Provisions wherever they can find them. I beg that you will tell Don Carlos that this is conduct which I don't allow of in any Officers or Troops; & that if I find he & his troops are guilty of that or any other misconduct, I will have him provisioned to the frontiers of Estremadura to which Province he shall go' (the volume includes a letter of protest by General Carlos at the injustice of this criticism). On a similar note, a letter of 18 December 1810 instructs Stewart to identify soldiers who have been involved in plundering bullocks and silverware: 'I never allow the British soldiers to be sent out on services of this description – that is, to collect cattle for food – or indeed at all, because I know that they never go out of the sight of their officer without committing an outrage...'. A series of letters in December 1810 give significant insight into Wellington's strategic thinking during the stalemate after the foiled French invasion of Portugal: 'I don't think that even with the addition of their reinforcements the enemy will be in sufficient force to attempt to establish themselves on the other side of the Tagus ... I think it a matter of doubt whether the enemy will endeavour ... to force the position of the Allies in front of Lisbon ...'. Wellington's occasional asperity as a commander is sometimes in view, as when Stewart has apparently questioned an order: 'I am concerned that you should conceive that I have directed you to keep in view objects "in which you are almost sure of failing". I am responsible, however, for these objects; and I hope they will not fail' (28 December 1810). Even more biting is a letter of 13 September 1813 after Stewart had lost four guns to d'Erlon's corps at the passes near Maya: 'I was very sorry to have lost those guns, as they are the only guns that have ever been lost by troops acting under my command'. A letter of 17 February 1813 treats with remarkable patience a question of privilege raised by the brigade of guards as to whether Stewart, not being a guards officer, could properly be their divisional commander.
Sir William Stewart (1774-1827) received his first commission as ensign at the age of 12: his early career is notable for a close friendship with Nelson (from whose flagship he witnessed the Battle of Copenhagen) and for being the originator and first commander what was later to be called the Rifle Brigade. He was sent to the Peninsula in January 1810, initially commanding the defence of Cadiz before being appointed to the 2nd division of Wellington's army in December 1810, in which capacity he fought in the first siege of Badajoz and the battle of Albuera. After being invalided home in July 1811, he returned to the Peninsula late in 1812, and fought at Vitoria and in a number of actions in the Pyrenees and southern France. A letter by General Hill in the present volume on 3 August 1813 thanks him for his 'gallant exertions' after he was obliged to leave the army because of his wounds.
Series of 31 letters to Lieutenant-General Sir William Stewart and others, Portugal, Spain, France and London, 1810-121
The correspondence comprises 27 autograph letters signed, three draft autograph letters (one imperfect) and six letters signed by Wellington, the majority to Lieutenant-General Sir William Stewart, with others to Colonel [later General Sir Warren] Peacocke (1), Charles Arbuthnot (as secretary of the Treasury, 1) and General Rowland Hill (later 1st Viscount Hill, 3 letters), Viseu, Torres Vedras, Mafra, Lisbon, Cartaxo, 'Between Elvas and Badajos', 'Villa de Toro, near Burgos', Fresneda, Lesaka, St Jean de Luz and London, 24 January 1810 - 22 November 1813 and 10 March 1821
Together 30 pages in autograph and 29 pages in a secretarial hand; with single letters by James Bathurst, General Carlos de España, Lord FitzRoy Somerset [later 1st Baron Raglan], General Hill and Henry Bathurst, 3rd Earl Bathurst, and seven copy letters. Interleaved in a copy of Official Correspondence between Field-Marshal His Grace the Duke of Wellington and Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir William Stewart K.C.B. etc, 1810-1821, [Edinburgh, 1871], privately printed in 50 copies, the letters bound in preceding their printed transcriptions. 19th-century purple roan. Provenance: Horatio Granville Murray Stewart (1834-1904, grandson of the recipient: bookplate); Christie's, 26 June 1991, lot 375.
Wellington in the Peninsula: discipline, supplies and strategy. The early letters to Stewart instruct him to take charge of the defence of Cadiz, giving orders on how to proceed if Cadiz is surrendered, and recommending 'a good understanding with the Spanish officers', in a later letter underlining the importance of convincing the Spaniards of the necessity for cooperation, although he writes critically of the Spanish approach ('The misfortune throughout the war has been, that the Spaniards are of a disposition too sanguine'), of their strategy and of the condition of their army ('The cavalry in particular is lamentably deficient in discipline'). His pessimism is summed up in a letter of 27 March 1810: 'The affairs of the Peninsula have invariably had the same appearance since I have known them; they have always appeared to be lost; means have always appeared inadequate to their objects ...'.
The letters show Wellington's constant attention to discipline, supplies and logistics, and his struggles to impose order: in a letter to Hill on 29 November 1810 he is particularly critical of the conduct of the French-born Spanish General Carlos de España: 'I have had more trouble with Don Carlos d'Espagne, & his Provisions than I have with those of the whole Army; & I am sorry to observe from a letter which Marshall Sir Wm Beresford has put into my hands that Don Carlos has threatened to make his Soldiers take Provisions wherever they can find them. I beg that you will tell Don Carlos that this is conduct which I don't allow of in any Officers or Troops; & that if I find he & his troops are guilty of that or any other misconduct, I will have him provisioned to the frontiers of Estremadura to which Province he shall go' (the volume includes a letter of protest by General Carlos at the injustice of this criticism). On a similar note, a letter of 18 December 1810 instructs Stewart to identify soldiers who have been involved in plundering bullocks and silverware: 'I never allow the British soldiers to be sent out on services of this description – that is, to collect cattle for food – or indeed at all, because I know that they never go out of the sight of their officer without committing an outrage...'. A series of letters in December 1810 give significant insight into Wellington's strategic thinking during the stalemate after the foiled French invasion of Portugal: 'I don't think that even with the addition of their reinforcements the enemy will be in sufficient force to attempt to establish themselves on the other side of the Tagus ... I think it a matter of doubt whether the enemy will endeavour ... to force the position of the Allies in front of Lisbon ...'. Wellington's occasional asperity as a commander is sometimes in view, as when Stewart has apparently questioned an order: 'I am concerned that you should conceive that I have directed you to keep in view objects "in which you are almost sure of failing". I am responsible, however, for these objects; and I hope they will not fail' (28 December 1810). Even more biting is a letter of 13 September 1813 after Stewart had lost four guns to d'Erlon's corps at the passes near Maya: 'I was very sorry to have lost those guns, as they are the only guns that have ever been lost by troops acting under my command'. A letter of 17 February 1813 treats with remarkable patience a question of privilege raised by the brigade of guards as to whether Stewart, not being a guards officer, could properly be their divisional commander.
Sir William Stewart (1774-1827) received his first commission as ensign at the age of 12: his early career is notable for a close friendship with Nelson (from whose flagship he witnessed the Battle of Copenhagen) and for being the originator and first commander what was later to be called the Rifle Brigade. He was sent to the Peninsula in January 1810, initially commanding the defence of Cadiz before being appointed to the 2nd division of Wellington's army in December 1810, in which capacity he fought in the first siege of Badajoz and the battle of Albuera. After being invalided home in July 1811, he returned to the Peninsula late in 1812, and fought at Vitoria and in a number of actions in the Pyrenees and southern France. A letter by General Hill in the present volume on 3 August 1813 thanks him for his 'gallant exertions' after he was obliged to leave the army because of his wounds.
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