CHURCHILL, Winston S. Typed letter signed ("Winston S. Churchill") as Prime Minister to George Tomlinson, M.P., 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, March 1945. 1 page, 4to, Prime Minister stationery, elaborately matted and framed with a portrait. [With:] Typed fragments of the actual diary of George Tomlinson, kept during the UN Conference.
APPOINTING THE BRITISH DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER CONVENTION. Churchill taps a Labour party MP for the British delegation to the critical U.N. conference at San Francisco in the spring of 1945. "The War Cabinet have been considering the question of the United Kingdom delegates to the San Francisco Conference, and the following list has been agreed: Full Delegates: Foreign Secretary [Anthony Eden], Lord President [Clement Attlee], Dominion Secretary [Lord Robert Cranborne], Lord Halifax. Assistant Delegates: Mr. Tomlinson, Miss E. Wilkinson, Miss F. Horsbrugh, Mr. Mabane. You will see that it is proposed to include you as an assistant delegate. As I am announcing the composition of the delegation in answer to a Private Notice Question this afternoon, I should be obliged if you would let me know at the earliest that your inclusion in the delegation is agreeable to you."
Tomlinson, a member of Churchill's wartime coalition government (Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labor and National Service), accepted the post and sat on the 18-member Economic and Social Council at the drafting sessions in San Francisco. He was a keen observer of events inside and out of the conference hall, and the fragments of his diary touch on many of the key problems of the meeting: such as whether to continue League of Nations mandates in Palestine ("The Arab States were all up in arms about this"), problems with the Soviets over Security Council voting rights and the status of ethnic minorities, and some of the lesser, more parochial problems, such as the American delegation's objection to language in the Charter about full employment. He told a reporter after Churchill's election defeat that allied cooperation would continue, and the defeat of Japan "was a first priority...Under no circumstances would we stand for the old 'catch as catch can' methods of private enterprise, but would insist upon the same principle of public well-being which had dominated our war policy being carried into the peace."