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拍品专文
The only printed text of the Atlantic Charter signed by both Churchill and Roosevelt known extant — memorializing a historic agreement, issued months before U.S. entry into World War II, which set the framework for the world order after the "final destruction of the Nazi tyranny"
Issued on 14 August 1941, months before the U.S. officially entered World War II, the Atlantic Charter is considered one of the most consequential foreign policy documents of the twentieth century. The agreement's call for "a wider and permanent system of general security" to secure a lasting peace after the war provided a framework for the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations.1 The document also marked a key shift in British foreign policy in its agreement to "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live", setting the tone for the post-war decline of British colonialism and the dismantling of the British Empire, despite Churchill's attempts to limit the charter's statement to territory conquered by the Axis powers.2 Following the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, which had furthered the United States's commitment to Great Britain during the European conflict, the Atlantic Conference and Charter served to further (and more publicly) bind the U.S. and Great Britain together, fomenting the alliance which would defeat the Axis powers and liberate Europe from the Nazi regime during the Second World War.
Despite its long-term implications, this joint venture was created by two men who faced immediate political concerns. Prime Minister Churchill knew that his country's survival was at stake. By mid-1941, Great Britain was the sole remaining country fighting against Nazi Germany on the Western Front. The German Luftwaffe began to rain bombs on London and the surrounding areas. British ships were being sunk regularly in the Atlantic, and German forces set plans to conquer Egypt and close off the Suez Canal, which would cut off the country from its resources in India. The Soviet Union would enter the war in June 1941 after the German invasion of the USSR, though few American or British policymakers believed the Soviets could resist the Nazi invasion for more than six weeks.3
When he ran for an unprecedented third term in 1940, Roosevelt, wary of Hitler's expansion abroad and isolationists at home, struggled to find a balance, campaigning that he had kept the nation out of war while simultaneously preparing for what he believed was inevitable.4 To muster public support for supporting the Allies, the President needed to showcase the grave dangers posed by a Nazi-dominated world. "The more it is discussed and looked into," he once told reporters, "the more terrible the thought becomes of having the world as a whole dominated by the kinds of influences that have been at work in the occupied or affiliated Nations. It's a thing that needs to be brought home to all of the democracies, more and more."5 While Roosevelt sought to rally support behind American involvement in the conflict, he had also hoped that a joint public statement between the two nations would quell the cries of his anti-interventionist critics — that he was silently undercutting America in favor of protecting Britain via back-room deals and secret commitments.
With these concerns in mind, Churchill, Roosevelt, and their top advisors would gather from 9-12 August 1941 aboard the U.S.S. Augusta in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. Churchill's goal during the conference was to encourage or ensure the U.S.'s eventual entrance into the war, though Roosevelt refused to broach that subject. Instead, he explained to Churchill that his ultimate goal was to announce that the two nations had discussed reparations from the Land-Lease Act, that these discussions did not include any commitments that were not previously authorized by Congress, and conclude with an announcement that the two leaders "had discussed certain principles relating to the civilisation of the world and had agreed on a statement of them".6 While he was extremely disappointed by the President's refusal to even discuss American entry into the war, Churchill had little other choice than to oblige. The Prime Minister cabled to his Cabinet in London from the conference: "The President attached a great deal of importance to the Joint Declaration, which he believes will affect the whole movement of United States opinion... I fear the President will be very much upset if no Joint Statement can be issued, and grave issues might be affected." 7
After days of fierce negotiation between the two men and their advisors, the Charter released on the final day of the conference established eight "common principles" which the United States and Great Britain vowed to support after the end of World War II. These principles echoed many of the ideals embodied in President Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" speech, including: their commitment to "see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned" and "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live"; their commitment to support all States, regardless of size or influence, in accessing the trade and raw materials required to sustain themselves; and their hope for an established peace for all nations after the fall of Nazi Germany, supported by a world-wide disarmament until a "wider and permanent system of general security" is established (though committing to aid and encourage "practicable measures for peace-loving people" whom suffer under the "crushing burden of armaments").
Through the joint statement, both nations would set a framework of free trade, economic and labor standards, international cooperation via the establishment of international organizations, and a dedication to a democratic form of self-government — a framework which would shape the political landscape of the second half of the twentieth century and would underpin America's foreign policy positions throughout the Cold War.
The signing of the Atlantic Charter
Despite its importance, however, no official, hand-signed version of the instrument was ever created, as the charter was issued as a joint policy statement between the two governments. Churchill and the British Government, unsuccessful at furthering America's entrance into the war, never regarded it as a formal State Paper. Roosevelt, despite his stronger emphasis on the instrument and its impact, could not view it as an official treaty; if he had done so, he would require the Senate to ratify it, and non-interventionists within Congress (and within the American public) would surely oppose it. Thus, the proclamation was merely mimeographed and released.8
In April 1942, George M. Elsey (1918-2015), an officer of the U.S. Naval Reserve, was just 24 years old when he was assigned to the White House Map Room—a hastily assembled hub for military intelligence and communication, established in the weeks following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Among the chart-covered walls, Elsey and his colleagues would receive all messages between the three leaders of the Allied Powers and would often brief Roosevelt and Churchill on military engagements and plans for future operations. Since Roosevelt's valet was prohibited from entering the room, Elsey and his fellow aides would often wheel the President throughout the room, as he studied the fresh battle maps on the walls.9
It was in May of 1943 during the Trident Conference, in which Churchill and Roosevelt discussed the invasions of Sicily, the planned landings at Normandy, and the extent of military force that should be used by the Allies, that Elsey would request the signatures from both men. In his memoir, the young officer provides a detailed history of his journey to receive this signed charter, as follows:
"...When Churchill set an early date for return to London...I overstepped the limits appropriate to my status. My father, as a hobby, was much interested in book design and fine printing. He especially admired the work of Bruce Rogers, the foremost typographer of the time... Rogers had designed and printed a broadside of the Atlantic Charter in a limited edition... I promptly ordered two copies. Emboldened by daily contact with the prime minister, I asked Captain Pim how I could get Churchill's signature on one. 'Oh, that's easy,' he replied. 'Have Harry Hopkins ask him. The P.M. will do anything for Harry.' And so I did."
"The morning Churchill was leaving for London and there was no sign of my charter, I assumed the worst—that it had been tossed aside. In came Pim. With a smile, he handed me the tightly rolled paper... 'Here it is, Elsey. The P.M. was eager to sign it when he saw it. His things were already packed. We had to hunt for his pen. He signed it, all dripping wet, just out of his bath.'" Within a few minutes, "Churchill came in for a last-minute look at the maps. I thanked him warmly, getting a cursory nod and this: 'I never signed it before. Now you must get the president to sign it and you will have something there.'"
Later encountering Hopkins in a hallway, Elsey thanked him for speaking to Churchill and asked him about the Prime Minister's last remark. Thinking for a minute, Hopkins observed that "there was never a formal piece of paper prepared for them to sign. They just radioed the text from their ships back to London and Washington for release."10 Elsey promptly "brought the charter to Roosevelt's private secretary, Grace Tully, and asked her to add it to the collection of books, photos, and other stuff piled on a table in her office awaiting the time Roosevelt would ask for 'all the autograph things.'" After weeks of anticipation, and "assuming the worst" about the fate of the document, "a messenger tapped on the Map Room door and handed me my charter... enhanced with a second signature."11
George Elsey went on to serve as one of President Harry Truman's top advisors and speechwriters; he accompanied the President to the Potsdam Conference, where the "Big Three" Allied leaders negotiated the settlement terms of the war. He was with Truman when the President authorized the atomic bombing of Japan, and he personally decoded the official message which announced the bombing of Hiroshima.12
___________________
1 Franklin D. Roosevelt: His Life and Times: An Encyclopedic View. Edited by Otis L. Graham Jr. and Meghan Robinson Wander (Boston: G. K. Hall & Co.), 1985. Page 11-13.
2 Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History. (New York: Harper & Brothers), 1948. Page 359-60.
3 Office of the Historian. “The Atlantic Conference & Charter, 1941.” U.S. Department of State. Accessed May 3, 2026. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/atlantic-conf.
4 National Park Service. “Roosevelt and Churchill: A Friendship That Saved the World.” U.S. Department of the Interior. Last modified November 17, 2015. https://www.nps.gov/articles/fdrww2.htm.
5 Dallek, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945. (New York: Oxford University Press), 1979. Page 281.
6 Ibid, p. 282.
7 Ibid.
8 Sherwood, p. 362.
9 Sidey, Hugh. “How a Secret Room Got Its Start in WWII.” Time, 7 Oct. 2002, https://time.com/archive/6667368/how-a-secret-room-got-its-start-in-wwii/.
10 Elsey, George McKee. An Unplanned Life: a Memoir by George McKee Elsey (Columbia: University of Missouri Press), 2005. 32.
11 Ibid., 33.
12 Schudel, Matt. “George M. Elsey, One of the Last Links to the FDR White House, Dies at 97.” The Washington Post, 9 Jan. 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/george-m-elsey-one-of-the-last-links-to-the-fdr-white-house-dies-at-97/2016/01/09/02078ac8-b6fb-11e5-a842-0feb51d1d124_story.html.
Issued on 14 August 1941, months before the U.S. officially entered World War II, the Atlantic Charter is considered one of the most consequential foreign policy documents of the twentieth century. The agreement's call for "a wider and permanent system of general security" to secure a lasting peace after the war provided a framework for the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations.1 The document also marked a key shift in British foreign policy in its agreement to "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live", setting the tone for the post-war decline of British colonialism and the dismantling of the British Empire, despite Churchill's attempts to limit the charter's statement to territory conquered by the Axis powers.2 Following the passage of the Lend-Lease Act, which had furthered the United States's commitment to Great Britain during the European conflict, the Atlantic Conference and Charter served to further (and more publicly) bind the U.S. and Great Britain together, fomenting the alliance which would defeat the Axis powers and liberate Europe from the Nazi regime during the Second World War.
Despite its long-term implications, this joint venture was created by two men who faced immediate political concerns. Prime Minister Churchill knew that his country's survival was at stake. By mid-1941, Great Britain was the sole remaining country fighting against Nazi Germany on the Western Front. The German Luftwaffe began to rain bombs on London and the surrounding areas. British ships were being sunk regularly in the Atlantic, and German forces set plans to conquer Egypt and close off the Suez Canal, which would cut off the country from its resources in India. The Soviet Union would enter the war in June 1941 after the German invasion of the USSR, though few American or British policymakers believed the Soviets could resist the Nazi invasion for more than six weeks.3
When he ran for an unprecedented third term in 1940, Roosevelt, wary of Hitler's expansion abroad and isolationists at home, struggled to find a balance, campaigning that he had kept the nation out of war while simultaneously preparing for what he believed was inevitable.4 To muster public support for supporting the Allies, the President needed to showcase the grave dangers posed by a Nazi-dominated world. "The more it is discussed and looked into," he once told reporters, "the more terrible the thought becomes of having the world as a whole dominated by the kinds of influences that have been at work in the occupied or affiliated Nations. It's a thing that needs to be brought home to all of the democracies, more and more."5 While Roosevelt sought to rally support behind American involvement in the conflict, he had also hoped that a joint public statement between the two nations would quell the cries of his anti-interventionist critics — that he was silently undercutting America in favor of protecting Britain via back-room deals and secret commitments.
With these concerns in mind, Churchill, Roosevelt, and their top advisors would gather from 9-12 August 1941 aboard the U.S.S. Augusta in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. Churchill's goal during the conference was to encourage or ensure the U.S.'s eventual entrance into the war, though Roosevelt refused to broach that subject. Instead, he explained to Churchill that his ultimate goal was to announce that the two nations had discussed reparations from the Land-Lease Act, that these discussions did not include any commitments that were not previously authorized by Congress, and conclude with an announcement that the two leaders "had discussed certain principles relating to the civilisation of the world and had agreed on a statement of them".6 While he was extremely disappointed by the President's refusal to even discuss American entry into the war, Churchill had little other choice than to oblige. The Prime Minister cabled to his Cabinet in London from the conference: "The President attached a great deal of importance to the Joint Declaration, which he believes will affect the whole movement of United States opinion... I fear the President will be very much upset if no Joint Statement can be issued, and grave issues might be affected." 7
After days of fierce negotiation between the two men and their advisors, the Charter released on the final day of the conference established eight "common principles" which the United States and Great Britain vowed to support after the end of World War II. These principles echoed many of the ideals embodied in President Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" speech, including: their commitment to "see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned" and "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live"; their commitment to support all States, regardless of size or influence, in accessing the trade and raw materials required to sustain themselves; and their hope for an established peace for all nations after the fall of Nazi Germany, supported by a world-wide disarmament until a "wider and permanent system of general security" is established (though committing to aid and encourage "practicable measures for peace-loving people" whom suffer under the "crushing burden of armaments").
Through the joint statement, both nations would set a framework of free trade, economic and labor standards, international cooperation via the establishment of international organizations, and a dedication to a democratic form of self-government — a framework which would shape the political landscape of the second half of the twentieth century and would underpin America's foreign policy positions throughout the Cold War.
The signing of the Atlantic Charter
Despite its importance, however, no official, hand-signed version of the instrument was ever created, as the charter was issued as a joint policy statement between the two governments. Churchill and the British Government, unsuccessful at furthering America's entrance into the war, never regarded it as a formal State Paper. Roosevelt, despite his stronger emphasis on the instrument and its impact, could not view it as an official treaty; if he had done so, he would require the Senate to ratify it, and non-interventionists within Congress (and within the American public) would surely oppose it. Thus, the proclamation was merely mimeographed and released.8
In April 1942, George M. Elsey (1918-2015), an officer of the U.S. Naval Reserve, was just 24 years old when he was assigned to the White House Map Room—a hastily assembled hub for military intelligence and communication, established in the weeks following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Among the chart-covered walls, Elsey and his colleagues would receive all messages between the three leaders of the Allied Powers and would often brief Roosevelt and Churchill on military engagements and plans for future operations. Since Roosevelt's valet was prohibited from entering the room, Elsey and his fellow aides would often wheel the President throughout the room, as he studied the fresh battle maps on the walls.9
It was in May of 1943 during the Trident Conference, in which Churchill and Roosevelt discussed the invasions of Sicily, the planned landings at Normandy, and the extent of military force that should be used by the Allies, that Elsey would request the signatures from both men. In his memoir, the young officer provides a detailed history of his journey to receive this signed charter, as follows:
"...When Churchill set an early date for return to London...I overstepped the limits appropriate to my status. My father, as a hobby, was much interested in book design and fine printing. He especially admired the work of Bruce Rogers, the foremost typographer of the time... Rogers had designed and printed a broadside of the Atlantic Charter in a limited edition... I promptly ordered two copies. Emboldened by daily contact with the prime minister, I asked Captain Pim how I could get Churchill's signature on one. 'Oh, that's easy,' he replied. 'Have Harry Hopkins ask him. The P.M. will do anything for Harry.' And so I did."
"The morning Churchill was leaving for London and there was no sign of my charter, I assumed the worst—that it had been tossed aside. In came Pim. With a smile, he handed me the tightly rolled paper... 'Here it is, Elsey. The P.M. was eager to sign it when he saw it. His things were already packed. We had to hunt for his pen. He signed it, all dripping wet, just out of his bath.'" Within a few minutes, "Churchill came in for a last-minute look at the maps. I thanked him warmly, getting a cursory nod and this: 'I never signed it before. Now you must get the president to sign it and you will have something there.'"
Later encountering Hopkins in a hallway, Elsey thanked him for speaking to Churchill and asked him about the Prime Minister's last remark. Thinking for a minute, Hopkins observed that "there was never a formal piece of paper prepared for them to sign. They just radioed the text from their ships back to London and Washington for release."10 Elsey promptly "brought the charter to Roosevelt's private secretary, Grace Tully, and asked her to add it to the collection of books, photos, and other stuff piled on a table in her office awaiting the time Roosevelt would ask for 'all the autograph things.'" After weeks of anticipation, and "assuming the worst" about the fate of the document, "a messenger tapped on the Map Room door and handed me my charter... enhanced with a second signature."11
George Elsey went on to serve as one of President Harry Truman's top advisors and speechwriters; he accompanied the President to the Potsdam Conference, where the "Big Three" Allied leaders negotiated the settlement terms of the war. He was with Truman when the President authorized the atomic bombing of Japan, and he personally decoded the official message which announced the bombing of Hiroshima.12
___________________
1 Franklin D. Roosevelt: His Life and Times: An Encyclopedic View. Edited by Otis L. Graham Jr. and Meghan Robinson Wander (Boston: G. K. Hall & Co.), 1985. Page 11-13.
2 Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History. (New York: Harper & Brothers), 1948. Page 359-60.
3 Office of the Historian. “The Atlantic Conference & Charter, 1941.” U.S. Department of State. Accessed May 3, 2026. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/atlantic-conf.
4 National Park Service. “Roosevelt and Churchill: A Friendship That Saved the World.” U.S. Department of the Interior. Last modified November 17, 2015. https://www.nps.gov/articles/fdrww2.htm.
5 Dallek, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945. (New York: Oxford University Press), 1979. Page 281.
6 Ibid, p. 282.
7 Ibid.
8 Sherwood, p. 362.
9 Sidey, Hugh. “How a Secret Room Got Its Start in WWII.” Time, 7 Oct. 2002, https://time.com/archive/6667368/how-a-secret-room-got-its-start-in-wwii/.
10 Elsey, George McKee. An Unplanned Life: a Memoir by George McKee Elsey (Columbia: University of Missouri Press), 2005. 32.
11 Ibid., 33.
12 Schudel, Matt. “George M. Elsey, One of the Last Links to the FDR White House, Dies at 97.” The Washington Post, 9 Jan. 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/george-m-elsey-one-of-the-last-links-to-the-fdr-white-house-dies-at-97/2016/01/09/02078ac8-b6fb-11e5-a842-0feb51d1d124_story.html.