![EISENHOWER, Dwight D. A typescript reading copy of the President's "Report to the Nation, October 31, 1956," a Speech on the Suez Crisis and Hungarian Uprising, WITH HUNDREDS OF HOLOGRAPH NOTATIONS IN WAX CRAYON AS GUIDES TO PACE AND DELIVERY, AND OVER A DOZEN ADDITIONAL TEXTUAL CHANGES, IN EISENHOWER'S HAND. 23 pages, 8vo, typed on rectos only, three punch holes along left margin. [With:] TLS from Ann C. Whitman to Emmet J. Hughes, 14 November 1956, enclosing this reading copy and one other [not present], which she asks Hughes to return. In a quarter morocco clamshell box.](https://www.christies.com/img/LotImages/2005/NYR/2005_NYR_01685_0224_000(110647).jpg?w=1)
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EISENHOWER, Dwight D. A typescript reading copy of the President's "Report to the Nation, October 31, 1956," a Speech on the Suez Crisis and Hungarian Uprising, WITH HUNDREDS OF HOLOGRAPH NOTATIONS IN WAX CRAYON AS GUIDES TO PACE AND DELIVERY, AND OVER A DOZEN ADDITIONAL TEXTUAL CHANGES, IN EISENHOWER'S HAND. 23 pages, 8vo, typed on rectos only, three punch holes along left margin. [With:] TLS from Ann C. Whitman to Emmet J. Hughes, 14 November 1956, enclosing this reading copy and one other [not present], which she asks Hughes to return. In a quarter morocco clamshell box.
EISENHOWER'S HEAVILY MARKED READING COPY OF HIS ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON SUEZ AND THE HUNGARIAN UPRISING. "WE HAVE CONSIDERED IT A BASIC MATTER...TO SUPPORT THE NEW STATE OF ISRAEL..."
When Egypt's leader Gamel Nasser threatened to nationalize the Suez Canal, Britain, France and Israel secretly colluded to go to war against him. Israel would strike Egypt first, with the British and French governments using the fighting as a pretext to send in their own forces to seize and hold the Suez Canal. Meanwhile in Hungary, massive street protests broke out against the nation's Soviet-puppet regime, lasting from 23 October until 4 November, when Moscow sent in the tanks to crush the uprising. A nervous world awaited America's response to both these crises.
Here, Eisenhower sends a clear message to the Soviets that the U. S. would not interfere in Hungary, and he sharply rebukes Britain, France and Israel. While making a pro forma commitment to assisting the rise of democracy in Eastern Europe, he goes on to say: "We have also - with respect to the Soviet Union - sought clearly to remove any false fears that would look upon new governments in these Eastern European countries as potential military allies. We have no such ulterior purpose." Turning to the explosive situation in the Middle East, Eisenhower asserts: "We have considered it a basic matter of United States policy to support the new state of Israel - and at the same time - to strengthen our bonds with Israel and with the Arab countries." He denounces the "misguided policies" of the Egyptian government, but unequivocally separates himself from the British, French and Israeli attacks. On 29 October, Israel launched its strike, capturing the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. The British and French plunged their forces in the next day. "The United States was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions," Eisenhower says. "Nor were we informed of them in advance. As it is the manifest right of any of these nations to take such decisions and actions, it is likewise our right - if our judgment so dictates - to dissent. We believe these actions have been taken in error. For we do not accept the use of force as a wise or proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes....And, beyond this, we are forced to doubt that resort to war will long serve the permanent interests of the attacking nations..."
The U. S. tried to put a resolution before the U. N. Security Council at the outset of the fighting, calling on Israel to withdraw its forces. But Britain and France exercised their veto. Now Eisenhower was taking his appeal to the court of world opinion. "In all the recent troubles in the Middle East, there have indeed been injustices suffered by all nations involved. But I do not believe that another instrument of injustice - war - is the remedy for these wrongs. There can be no peace without law. And there can be no law - if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us - and another for our friends." The pressure worked. By 5 November the fighting stopped. The British and French backed down. Israel pulled its forces out of Gaza and Sinai, and U. N. peacekeepers patrolled the Israeli-Egyptian border.
EISENHOWER'S HEAVILY MARKED READING COPY OF HIS ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON SUEZ AND THE HUNGARIAN UPRISING. "WE HAVE CONSIDERED IT A BASIC MATTER...TO SUPPORT THE NEW STATE OF ISRAEL..."
When Egypt's leader Gamel Nasser threatened to nationalize the Suez Canal, Britain, France and Israel secretly colluded to go to war against him. Israel would strike Egypt first, with the British and French governments using the fighting as a pretext to send in their own forces to seize and hold the Suez Canal. Meanwhile in Hungary, massive street protests broke out against the nation's Soviet-puppet regime, lasting from 23 October until 4 November, when Moscow sent in the tanks to crush the uprising. A nervous world awaited America's response to both these crises.
Here, Eisenhower sends a clear message to the Soviets that the U. S. would not interfere in Hungary, and he sharply rebukes Britain, France and Israel. While making a pro forma commitment to assisting the rise of democracy in Eastern Europe, he goes on to say: "We have also - with respect to the Soviet Union - sought clearly to remove any false fears that would look upon new governments in these Eastern European countries as potential military allies. We have no such ulterior purpose." Turning to the explosive situation in the Middle East, Eisenhower asserts: "We have considered it a basic matter of United States policy to support the new state of Israel - and at the same time - to strengthen our bonds with Israel and with the Arab countries." He denounces the "misguided policies" of the Egyptian government, but unequivocally separates himself from the British, French and Israeli attacks. On 29 October, Israel launched its strike, capturing the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. The British and French plunged their forces in the next day. "The United States was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions," Eisenhower says. "Nor were we informed of them in advance. As it is the manifest right of any of these nations to take such decisions and actions, it is likewise our right - if our judgment so dictates - to dissent. We believe these actions have been taken in error. For we do not accept the use of force as a wise or proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes....And, beyond this, we are forced to doubt that resort to war will long serve the permanent interests of the attacking nations..."
The U. S. tried to put a resolution before the U. N. Security Council at the outset of the fighting, calling on Israel to withdraw its forces. But Britain and France exercised their veto. Now Eisenhower was taking his appeal to the court of world opinion. "In all the recent troubles in the Middle East, there have indeed been injustices suffered by all nations involved. But I do not believe that another instrument of injustice - war - is the remedy for these wrongs. There can be no peace without law. And there can be no law - if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us - and another for our friends." The pressure worked. By 5 November the fighting stopped. The British and French backed down. Israel pulled its forces out of Gaza and Sinai, and U. N. peacekeepers patrolled the Israeli-Egyptian border.