ACTIVATING THE CULPER SPY RING FOR INTELLIGENCE ON ROCHAMBEAU'S LANDING AT NEWPORT
ACTIVATING THE CULPER SPY RING FOR INTELLIGENCE ON ROCHAMBEAU'S LANDING AT NEWPORT

GEORGE WASHINGTON, 11 JULY 1780

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ACTIVATING THE CULPER SPY RING FOR INTELLIGENCE ON ROCHAMBEAU'S LANDING AT NEWPORT
GEORGE WASHINGTON, 11 JULY 1780
WASHINGTON, George (1732-1799). Letter signed ("Go:Washington") as Commander-in-Chief to Major Benjamin Tallmadge, Head Quarters, Bergen County, 11 July 1780.
One page, 336 x 204mm (lower left margin trimmed affecting two letters of text, light dustsoiling at upper margin). Body of the text in the hand of Tench TILGHMAN (1744-1786). Docketed on the verso by Benjamin Tallmadge (1754-1835).
來源
Sotheby's New York, 18 June 2002, lot 277
出版
The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, 27:84

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Peter Klarnet
Peter Klarnet Senior Specialist, Americana

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Washington urges his spymaster to revive the Culper Spy Ring to assess potential threats to Rochambeau's landing at Newport, deploying the same army that would later prove critical in securing the 1781 victory at Yorktown.

Washington's activation of the Culper Spy Ring revealed that the British were aware of Rochambeau's imminent arrivalvia intelligence supplied by Benedict Arnold.

In his effort to ensure Rochambeau's landing went smoothly Washington urges the reactivation of the Culper Spy Ring monitoring enemy activities on Long Island.

"As we may every moment expect the arrival of the French Fleet, a revival of the correspondence with the Culpers will be of very great importance. If the younger cannot be engaged again, you will endeavour to prevail upon the elder to give you information of the movements and position of the enemy upon Long Island. as whether they are all confined to the post at Brooklyn, or whether they have any detached posts, and where, and what is their strength at those posts—in short desire him to inform you of whatever comes under his notice and which seems worthy of communication. You will transmit your letters to General [Robert] Howe, who will forward them to me." In a short postscript, he requests that he "desire[s] him to attend particularly to the provision which they are making of Wood and Forage—& whether they drive any stock within their lines." (The italicized words in Washington's own hand.)

Washington's eyes and ears in New York: the Culper Spy Ring. Organized in 1778, the Culper Spy Ring provided Washington with critical intelligence on enemy activities in British-occupied New York. The ring was commanded by Benjamin Tallmadge, who worked with Caleb Brewster of Norwalk, Connecticut, who in turn, enlisted his childhood friend, Abraham Woodhull who lived across the sound at Setauket on Long Island. Woodhull worked with various agents in British-occupied New York City to gather intelligence on British troop movements, the state of fortifications, and other critical intelligence. Operating with codenames, Woodhull (aka Samuel Culper, Sr.), worked with several agents in the city, most notably Robert Townsend (aka Samuel Culper, Jr.), a tailor who attended to often loose-lipped British officers. Townshend, who also wrote a society column in James Rivington's Loyalist newspaper, was a partner in the publication with Rivington (who was also a member of the Culper Ring). Intelligence gathered in New York was transferred to the north shore of Long Island where it was ferried across to Connecticut express riders who would speed the intelligence to Washington's headquarters west of the Hudson.

Washington's final activation of the Culper Ring to assess the British threat to Rochambeau's army landing in America. Frustrated at the length of time it took for intelligence to arrive via the circuitous route taken by the Culpers, Washington shut down the operation in the spring of 1780. However, the imminent arrival of Rochambeau's expeditionary force at Newport, Rhode Island, prompted him to reactivate the network to determine if the British were aware. Washington's letter reached Tallmadge at Cortland Manor two days later on 13 July who responded reassuring that the commander-in-chief's orders would be "faithfully executed, I shall set out tomorrow morning for Fairfield, where I will endeavour to put matters on such a footing, (which by omission have in some measure got deranged) as may answer your Excellency’s Expectations…"1 Tallmadge reached Fairfield, Connecticut on 15 July where he found Brewster, who sailed to Long Island that evening. There, Brewster found Woodhull too ill to travel to New York, but sent another agent instead to visit Robert Townshend and determine if the British were aware of the French fleet's arrival at Rhode Island.

What came back from Townshend was explosive. Not only were the British aware of Rochambeau's imminent arrival, but they were preparing a fleet of fifty transports to ferry troops up Long Island Sound—a naval squadron had already begun to sail toward Rhode Island. In fact Sir Henry Clinton, commanding British forces in New York, knew of the French force's arrival since 12 June. His source was none other than Benedict Arnold whom Washington had briefed in early June. At his earliest opportunity Arnold sent the intelligence to Clinton via John André. The arrest of André on a separate mission in September exposed Arnold's treachery, compelling him to escape to the British lines via the H.M.S Vulture and forever tarnish his reputation as one of Washington's most able field commanders. His name is now forever synonymous with betrayal and treachery.

With such advance notice, Clinton could mount his planned expedition against Rochambeau quietly without arousing Washington's suspicion. As historian Alexander Rose observed, if Clinton's gambit succeeded," Rochambeau's soldiers—tired after their long voyage, unfamiliar with the terrain, and camped out in the open—would be surprised by Clinton's redcoated veterans and put to flight while the Royal Navy pounded the French squadron." Such a blow, on the heels of the near disastrous Franco-American effort at the Battle of Newport the previous year, "would surely cool Paris's ardor for her American allies."2

Rochambeau's army landed at Newport on 11 July—the same day that Washington wrote the present letter to Tallmadge to gather intelligence on Clinton's intentions. When he learned of the British plans ten days later, and shrewdly proposed a plan to attack New York while Clinton was making his attempt on the French forces at Newport. His advisors however dissuaded the commander-in-chief from the action, citing the lack of resources against it. But that did not stop Washington from crossing the Hudson to create the illusion that he might be moving against Manhattan from the North as a diversion. Clinton was also thwarted by a lack of resources necessary to mount a siege against the French at Newport while defending his position in New York. The final straw for Clinton came in the form of contrary winds in Hell Gate that prevented transports from arriving in New York to ferry British land forces to Rhode Island.

Rochambeau and his vulnerable army were safe. Although Washington was hopeful that the combined Franco-American forces would be sufficient to dislodge Clinton from New York, it never came to pass. Fortunately for Washington, circumstances conspired to allow him the opportunity to take advantage of the French alliance and capture the forces under Charles Cornwallis at Yorktown in the fall of 1781—effectively concluding the War of Independence.

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1The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, 27:84 Note.
2 Alexander Rose, Washington's Spies The Story of America's First Spy Ring. (New York: Bantam Books Trade Paperbacks, 2006), 190.

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