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拍品专文
"...If you go to James River, a large part of the army must remain on or near the Fredericksburg line, to protect Washington..."
After the disastrous Battle of Fredericksburg, Lincoln responds to a joint letter by two Generals on their planned advance toward Richmond.
Major Generals William B. Franklin and William F. Smith addressed Lincoln in a joint letter shortly after the battle, questioning Union leadership and promoting an alternate plan to approach Richmond—notwithstanding Franklin's recent disgrace at Fredericksburg. In a draft letter (included in this lot), the pair criticizes the Army of the Potomac's current advance toward Richmond via rail and wagon. Rather, they suggest amassing a quarter-million troops and sailing them down the James River, landing the soldiers as close to Richmond as possible; from there, the army would march towards the Confederate capitol, receiving continued provisions every three days from pontoons sent down-river.
Lincoln's reply shows his firm grasp over military matters and his willingness to consider alternative suggestions from his officers: "Yours of the 20th suggesting a plan of operations for the Army of the Potomac, is received. I have hastily read the plan, and shall yet try to give it more deliberate consideration, with the aid of military men.... the difficulties you point out pertaining to the Fredericksburg line are obvious and palpable. But, now, as heretofore, if you go to James River, a large part of the army must remain on or near the Fredericksburg line, to protect Washington. It is the old difficulty." The President, however, concludes by observing the inconsistency shown by the recently-disgraced General Franklin: "When I saw Gen. Franklin at Harrison's Landing on James River last July, I can not be mistaken in saying that he distinctly advised the bringing of the Army away from there."
Franklin's reply to Lincoln on 26 December attempts to explain his perceived inconsistency, assuring the President that Washington would be defended under his plan and stating: "I presume that you are right in supposing that I advised the withdrawal of the Army from James River in July last. I think that under the same circumstances I would give the same advice. The Army was debilitated by what it had already gone through, was in an unhealthy position, its sick list was enormous, and there was a prospect that we would have two worst months August & September. The effect of this would have been to ruin the Army in health." Despite the heavy losses suffered in Fredericksburg (and particularly within Franklin's own division) just days prior, he concludes the letter: "Circumstances are very different now. The Army is in good health, and the best months of the year are before us." Franklin's confidence in their ability to conquer Richmond would not bear true—the Confederate capitol would only be captured in early April 1865, just days before Lee's surrender.
The Battle of Fredericksburg, fought just a few days before this correspondence was exchanged from December 11-15, proved to be one of the costliest battles of the Civil War for Union forces. In the fall and winter of 1862, the Northern public was increasingly losing confidence in Lincoln and the Union war effort, witnessing a slew of Confederate successes in Kentucky and Maryland and few offensive advances from the Union side. Desperate for a victory, President Lincoln removed General McClellan as Commander of the Army of the Potomac just a month prior to this battle and prodded his replacement, General Ambrose Burnside, to advance into Virginia and attempt to capture Richmond. At Fredericksburg, however, Lincoln's plan to boost Northern morale failed dramatically. Union forces suffered over twice as many casualties as the Confederates, and Lincoln's administration and his generals were openly slammed as weak, foolish, or traitorous by politicians and the press. After hearing of the losses suffered, the President himself stated: "If there is a worse place than hell, I am in it." When pressed, General Burnside would blame Franklin personally after numerous failures in communication wreaked havoc on his division; he soon demanded that he and Smith both be relieved of command in late January. However, Lincoln would remove Burnside from command instead, announcing Joseph Hooker as the new Commander of the Army of the Potomac in February. Upon hearing of Hooker's appointment, however, Franklin promptly resigned his commission, refusing to serve under him.
After the disastrous Battle of Fredericksburg, Lincoln responds to a joint letter by two Generals on their planned advance toward Richmond.
Major Generals William B. Franklin and William F. Smith addressed Lincoln in a joint letter shortly after the battle, questioning Union leadership and promoting an alternate plan to approach Richmond—notwithstanding Franklin's recent disgrace at Fredericksburg. In a draft letter (included in this lot), the pair criticizes the Army of the Potomac's current advance toward Richmond via rail and wagon. Rather, they suggest amassing a quarter-million troops and sailing them down the James River, landing the soldiers as close to Richmond as possible; from there, the army would march towards the Confederate capitol, receiving continued provisions every three days from pontoons sent down-river.
Lincoln's reply shows his firm grasp over military matters and his willingness to consider alternative suggestions from his officers: "Yours of the 20th suggesting a plan of operations for the Army of the Potomac, is received. I have hastily read the plan, and shall yet try to give it more deliberate consideration, with the aid of military men.... the difficulties you point out pertaining to the Fredericksburg line are obvious and palpable. But, now, as heretofore, if you go to James River, a large part of the army must remain on or near the Fredericksburg line, to protect Washington. It is the old difficulty." The President, however, concludes by observing the inconsistency shown by the recently-disgraced General Franklin: "When I saw Gen. Franklin at Harrison's Landing on James River last July, I can not be mistaken in saying that he distinctly advised the bringing of the Army away from there."
Franklin's reply to Lincoln on 26 December attempts to explain his perceived inconsistency, assuring the President that Washington would be defended under his plan and stating: "I presume that you are right in supposing that I advised the withdrawal of the Army from James River in July last. I think that under the same circumstances I would give the same advice. The Army was debilitated by what it had already gone through, was in an unhealthy position, its sick list was enormous, and there was a prospect that we would have two worst months August & September. The effect of this would have been to ruin the Army in health." Despite the heavy losses suffered in Fredericksburg (and particularly within Franklin's own division) just days prior, he concludes the letter: "Circumstances are very different now. The Army is in good health, and the best months of the year are before us." Franklin's confidence in their ability to conquer Richmond would not bear true—the Confederate capitol would only be captured in early April 1865, just days before Lee's surrender.
The Battle of Fredericksburg, fought just a few days before this correspondence was exchanged from December 11-15, proved to be one of the costliest battles of the Civil War for Union forces. In the fall and winter of 1862, the Northern public was increasingly losing confidence in Lincoln and the Union war effort, witnessing a slew of Confederate successes in Kentucky and Maryland and few offensive advances from the Union side. Desperate for a victory, President Lincoln removed General McClellan as Commander of the Army of the Potomac just a month prior to this battle and prodded his replacement, General Ambrose Burnside, to advance into Virginia and attempt to capture Richmond. At Fredericksburg, however, Lincoln's plan to boost Northern morale failed dramatically. Union forces suffered over twice as many casualties as the Confederates, and Lincoln's administration and his generals were openly slammed as weak, foolish, or traitorous by politicians and the press. After hearing of the losses suffered, the President himself stated: "If there is a worse place than hell, I am in it." When pressed, General Burnside would blame Franklin personally after numerous failures in communication wreaked havoc on his division; he soon demanded that he and Smith both be relieved of command in late January. However, Lincoln would remove Burnside from command instead, announcing Joseph Hooker as the new Commander of the Army of the Potomac in February. Upon hearing of Hooker's appointment, however, Franklin promptly resigned his commission, refusing to serve under him.